DhanalakshmiIAS: November 2012

CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2. Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3. Scope. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4. Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.5. Users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.6. Using the publication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. NUCLEAR ENERGY STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Scope of nuclear energy strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Approach to human resources development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Nuclear safety considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4. Impact of the regulatory approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.5. First nuclear power plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. ANALYSIS OF INFRASTRUCTURE ACTIVITIES, COMPETENCIES AND
RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. DEVELOPING A WORKFORCE PLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.1. Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.2. Recruitment considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5. CONSIDERATIONS FOR STAFFING A NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAMME. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.1. Overall approach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.2. Phase 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.3. Phase 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.4. Phase 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.5. Post-Phase 3 (operations, decommissioning) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6. THE ROLE OF SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6.1. Education/research and training institutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6.2. Technical support and R&D organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7. KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT FOR NEW NUCLEAR POWER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7.1. Need for nuclear knowledge management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7.2. Benefits of knowledge management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8. SUMMARY: HOW TO GET STARTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
8.1. Prerequisites for workforce planning (Phase 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
8.2. Key steps for workforce planning in the context of a human resources strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
9. OVERVIEW OF CASE STUDIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
APPENDIX I: AN EXAMPLE OF NPP STAFFING NUMBERS BY FUNCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
APPENDIX II: WORK FUNCTION DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
APPENDIX III: AN EXAMPLE OF QUALIFICATION AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
BY WORK FUNCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
APPENDIX IV: KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
APPENDIX V: CASE STUDY OF DAYA BAY: A POSITIVE TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY BETWEEN FRANCE AND CHINA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
APPENDIX VI: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMME IN
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
APPENDIX VII: NUCLEAR WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT: AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE. . . . . . . . . 79
APPENDIX VIII: WORKFORCE PLANNING: CASE STUDY OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES — 
HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
APPENDIX IX: FEASIBILITY STUDY OF NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
IN ARMENIA: EVALUATION OF HUMAN RESOURCES NEEDS 
IN CONJUNCTION WITH NEW BUILD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
APPENDIX X: MODELLING WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT FOR NEW NUCLEAR POWER
PROGRAMMES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
STRUCTURE OF THE IAEA NUCLEAR ENERGY SERIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
1
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. BACKGROUND
With the recent upsurge in interest in, and support for, nuclear power, many Member States are considering
the introduction of nuclear power as part of their national energy strategy. The introduction of a nuclear energy
programme is a major undertaking with significant implications for many aspects of national infrastructure, ranging
from the ‘hard’ (or physical) aspects of infrastructure, such as the capacity of the electricity grid, transport access
and the manufacturing base, to softer (or human) areas, such as stakeholder involvement and human resources
development. For a country that does not already have nuclear power, and even for those wishing to significantly
expand an existing nuclear energy capability, it may take up to 10–15 years to develop the necessary infrastructure.
Additionally, a commitment of at least 100 years is needed to sustain this national infrastructure throughout plant
operation, decommissioning and waste disposal.
To facilitate progress towards the development of the necessary infrastructure for a country that is considering
the introduction of nuclear power as part of its national energy strategy, the IAEA has issued a guidance publication
entitled Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power [1] describing three distinct
phases in the development of a national infrastructure for nuclear power:
—Phase 1: Considerations before a decision to launch a nuclear power programme is taken;
—Phase 2: Preparatory work for the construction of a nuclear power plant (NPP) after a policy decision has been
taken;
—Phase 3: Activities to implement a first NPP.
The achievement of the infrastructure conditions for each of these phases is marked by a specific milestone at
which point the progress and success of the development effort can be assessed and a decision made to move on to
the next phase. These are:
—Milestone 1: Ready to make a knowledgeable commitment to a nuclear programme;
—Milestone 2: Ready to invite bids for the first NPP;
—Milestone 3: Ready to commission and operate the first NPP.
The publication goes on to detail a total of 19 different infrastructure areas that need to be addressed for each
of the three phases. These areas are identified in Table 1.
When these milestones were introduced to Member States, the Member States requested additional assistance
on how to implement this guidance. In particular, they indicated that they needed assistance in developing the
necessary range of competencies required to implement a nuclear power programme. This report is intended to
provide that additional assistance.
A number of other publications have also been developed to assist Member States, including:
—Responsibilities and Capabilities of a Nuclear Energy Programme Implementing Organization [2];
—Initiating Nuclear Power Programmes: Responsibilities and Capabilities of Owners and Operators [3];
—Evaluation of the Status of National Nuclear Infrastructure Development [4].
Much of the detail of the roles and responsibilities of the NEPIO and the owner/operator organization is
contained in these publications, and it is essential that users are familiar with their contents as well as the Milestones
publication to ensure the appropriate application of the guidance contained in this report.
2
TABLE 1. INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES AND MILESTONES
For the purposes of this publication, workforce planning is defined as:
The systematic identification and analysis of what an organization (and a country) is going to need in terms of
the size, type and quality of workforce to achieve its objectives. It determines what mix of experience and
competencies are expected to be needed, and identifies the steps that should be taken to get the right number
of the right people in the right place at the right time. Further, the term workforce is intended to refer to all
personnel involved in the programme.
Workforce planning should be seen as an integral part of an organization’s human resources (HR) development
strategy and plans, and should be consistent with other HR processes such as recruitment, training and development
and remuneration, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Many of these issues are addressed in the IAEA report on Managing
Human Resources in the Field of Nuclear Energy [5]. In turn, the management of human resources should be a part
of the wider integrated management system in order to ensure safe and reliable operation, as discussed in the IAEA
Safety Standards Series publication on The Management System for Facilities and Activities [6].
It is extremely important for the reader to understand that the prerequisites for nuclear power programme
workforce planning are the establishment of clear roles, responsibilities and functions for all organizations involved
in the programme. Absent these roles, responsibilities and functions, there is no framework/basis for workforce
planning. The NEPIO should provide a basis for these roles, responsibilities and functions, as well as for
coordination among those organizations involved in considering a nuclear power programme [2].
ISSUES
MILESTONE
1
MILESTONE
2
MILESTONE
3
National position
Nuclear safety
Management
Funding and financing
Legislative framework
Safeguards
Regulatory framework
Radiation protection
Electrical grid
Human resources development
Stakeholder involvement
Site and supporting facilities
Environmental protection
Emergency planning
Security and physical protection
Nuclear fuel cycle
Radioactive waste
Industrial involvement
Procurement
CONDITIONS
CONDITIONS
CONDITIONS
3
1.2. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this publication is to assist Member States in developing an effective workforce plan, at both
the organizational and national levels, by providing a structured approach to enable them to estimate the human
resources needs of their programme, assess their existing level of capability, identify competence gaps and plan for
how to fill these gaps according to the nature and scope of their nuclear power programme (see Fig. 2).
An important element of effective human resources management is the management of knowledge — the
knowledge that individuals need as part of the competence requirements for assigned tasks and the additional
knowledge they acquire in carrying out those tasks. This knowledge will be needed by several generations of the
workforce during the lifetime of the nuclear energy programme. Therefore, this publication also includes details
about the need for, and benefits of, establishing an appropriate knowledge management system within the nuclear
energy programme to help ensure the sustainability of the programme in the long term.
An organizational approach is proposed outlining the needs of the three main organizations identified in the
Milestones publication:
—The nuclear energy programme implementing organization (NEPIO);
—The regulatory body;
—The nuclear power plant operating organization.
These organizations are analysed based on their respective responsibilities for the implementation of various
infrastructure requirements through the successive phases of the programme.
Appropriate case study material is also included to illustrate how these concepts were/are being achieved in
reality for recently developed nuclear energy programmes.
1.3. SCOPE
This publication has been prepared as guidance on the workforce planning aspects of the development of a
national infrastructure for nuclear power. Although it has been written as a stand-alone guide, users should be
familiar with, and have access to, the Milestones publication, which provides guidance on options for the
FIG. 1. Typical elements of a human resources development strategy.
4
organization and allocation of responsibilities for implementation, as well as reports [2, 3] dealing with the NEPIO
and operating organizations, respectively. This guidance is considered to be particularly important for Phases 1 and
2, when a Member State may have limited nuclear expertise and little external support to begin developing its initial
workforce plans. By the time Phase 3 is begun, it is likely that the Member State may obtain considerable support
from a chosen vendor and/or external specialist support.
A wide range of technical competencies (both nuclear and non-nuclear) are required to embark on a nuclear
energy programme. It is also important to recognize that significant leadership, general management and specific
project management competencies will be needed to successfully implement such a programme. The appropriate
IAEA publications applicable to these fields are included in the Bibliography.
The first step recommended in the Milestones publication in the consideration of a nuclear energy programme
by a Member State is the formation by the government of a group to study the feasibility of embarking upon a
nuclear power programme in the country. This group is described as the NEPIO. The higher level responsibilities
and capabilities of the NEPIO itself are addressed in the IAEA publication Responsibilities and Capabilities of the
Nuclear Energy Programme Implementing Organization [2]. In the current publication, it is assumed that the
NEPIO has been established and is functioning and that, as part of its responsibility to oversee the establishment of
the national infrastructure necessary to implement the programme, the NEPIO will develop a workforce plan to
complete Phase 1, implement Phases 2 and 3, and prepare for operations.
1.4. STRUCTURE
This publication is divided into several sections. Section 2 considers the Member State’s nuclear energy goals,
objectives and strategy, and how this may impact the resources needed. Sections 3 and 4 focus on the competencies
and human resources needs of the various responsible organizations during each of the three phases associated with
the development of the national infrastructure. Section 5 provides practical guidance, phase by phase, on the
recruitment and staffing of the various responsible organizations. Guidance on operation, maintenance and eventual
decommissioning of NPPs can be found in many other IAEA publications, and therefore these issues will only be
addressed in this publication insofar as the infrastructure required to support them is an extension of that needed to
achieve the first three phases and should already be in place by the time that Milestone 3 is achieved
(commissioning of the first nuclear plant). Section 6 considers the role of other organizations, especially education
and training institutions, in supporting the development of a nuclear energy programme. Section 7 introduces the
concept of knowledge management at the outset of a new nuclear energy programme. Section 8 provides a
summary of the key messages in this publication in the form of an overview of how to get started in the workforce
planning process. Finally, Section 9 provides an overview of the case studies included as appendices to this
publication, which are intended to present the real and varied experience of Member States that have experience in
implementing a national infrastructure for nuclear energy.
It is assumed that a Member State considering the option of nuclear power would already have established a
national infrastructure for radiation, waste and transport safety in support of other nuclear technologies being used
in the country, such as nuclear medicine and radiography [1]. This assumption applies in this publication, and so the
resource requirements considered here are only those specific requirements for the nuclear power programme
beyond the requirements needed for other, less demanding nuclear applications.
An important consideration with respect to safety and regulation is the decision of whether to strengthen any
existing regulatory body created to ensure the safety of industrially/medically utilized radionuclides or to create a
new regulatory body to oversee the implementation of a nuclear energy programme. There are benefits and risks
associated with both approaches, and if a new regulatory body is to be established, the potential for tension to arise
between the two needs to be understood and properly managed. The IAEA has extensive guidance, tools and
training materials available to support the detailed analysis of competence requirements and their subsequent
development for a nuclear energy programme regulatory body staff. The most relevant publications on on-line
materials are listed in the Bibliography.
The IAEA also has a substantial body of documentation and guidance to support the operation and
improvement of existing nuclear power programmes; this publication, like the Milestones publication [1], is
specifically aimed at the development of new nuclear power programmes. Again, the most relevant of these
publications are included in the Bibliography.
5
1.5. USERS
Decision makers, advisers and senior managers in the governmental organizations, utilities, industry and
regulatory bodies of a country with an interest in developing nuclear power, especially those with responsibilities
for human resources development, may use this publication to identify and plan for the competencies and human
resources needed to implement a nuclear power programme. Although, as has already been stated, the publication
is aimed primarily at those countries considering nuclear power for the first time, much of the information
contained may be equally useful to those countries considering a major expansion of an existing nuclear power
programme, especially if significant time has elapsed since the construction of the last NPP.
This publication will also be of particular interest to national and international educational and training
establishments, suppliers, and research and technical support organizations, which may be called upon to assist in
developing the national infrastructure.
1.6. USING THE PUBLICATION
An overview of the workforce planning process for achievement of the milestones is presented in the flow
chart in Fig. 2, which shows how the information contained within the publication relates to the different steps in
the workforce planning process. Again, the reader is reminded that a prerequisite for starting this process in Phase
1 is clearly defined roles, responsibilities and functions for the NEPIO and other organizations that have a stake in
considering a national nuclear power programme.
2. NUCLEAR ENERGY STRATEGY
2.1. SCOPE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY STRATEGY
Although the range of competencies needed to design, license, construct, regulate, commission, operate and
eventually decommission an NPP are largely the same for any nuclear power programme, the planned scope and
goals of the nuclear power programme, the desired levels of technology transfer, longer term capability, approaches
to plant life management (PLM) and desired self-sufficiency in nuclear energy will all have a major impact on the
extent to which these competencies need to be developed within the national capability, as opposed to being
provided by external suppliers.
Also, the ultimate intended application of the nuclear power, such as electricity generation, desalination and
public heating, will have some influence on the range of competencies needed. For the purposes of this publication,
it is assumed that the primary purpose is for electricity generation.
2.2. APPROACH TO HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT
When considering the extent to which a Member State wishes to develop its national capabilities, it is
important to be realistic about the gaps in existing capability and to take due account of the scope of other existing
or planned national infrastructure projects. Trying to develop national capability extensively during the project for
a first NPP may create unacceptable risks in terms of time and cost. Also, extensive national involvement in the
construction of a first NPP may place other national infrastructure projects at risk. It is also important to remember
that, due to the long term nature (see Section 2.3) of a nuclear energy programme, the human resources
6
requirements will span several generations of the workforce, so workforce planning will be an ongoing process for
all organizations involved in sustaining the nuclear energy programme.
If only a single NPP or a very small number of units are planned, then it may not be appropriate for a Member
State to develop all the competencies identified in this publication, particularly those for the design, construction
and commissioning of the plant. In this case, the Member State should focus on developing and maintaining the
internal competencies to operate and maintain (and eventually decommission) the plant in a safe and secure manner
and may contract out many of those competencies required during Phases 1 and 2 of the programme.
However, even in this scenario, the Member State must develop the competence to fulfil the role of the
‘intelligent customer’1, that is, the Member State must be able to assess its requirements, prepare an appropriate bid
1 For the purposes of this publication, an intelligent customer is defined as an organization (or individual) that has the
competence to specify the scope and standard of a required product or service and subsequently assess whether the supplied product or
service meets the specified requirements.
Develop Workforce Plan
Define the objectives of the national
Nuclear Power programme
Compare HR needs to existing and
expected national HR resources
(Gap Analysis)
Can gaps
Be addressed?
Determine how to address gaps
Review/Revise Workforce Plan
as Phases progress
Determine the HR needs of the
Programme based on these objectives
No
Yes
Discussed in Section 2
Section 3
Sections 4, 5, 6 & 7
DeDveevloeplo Wp worokrfkofrocrec eP lpalnan
Define the objectives of the national
nuclear power programme
Compare HR needs to existing and
expected national HR resources
(gap analysis)
Can gaps
be addressed?
DeDteertmerimnein heo hwo wto taod addredsress gsa gpasps
Review/revise workforce plan
as phases progress
Determine the HR needs of the
programme based on these objectives
FIG. 2. Simplified flow chart for workforce planning process.
7
invitation specification (BIS) [7] and confirm that any bids will meet the requirements of their specification, albeit
with specialist support.
In reality, even within a turnkey contract (where a project is constructed by a vendor and handed over to the
customer when ready to use), the Member State must still be an intelligent customer for the contract, and there may
still be a variety of local infrastructure activities for which the Member State will retain responsibility (see
Section 2.5).
At the other extreme, if a Member State plans to implement a significant NPP construction programme and
has the ultimate desire to be self-sufficient in new plant construction, then it will be advantageous to develop (over
time) all the required competencies across the 19 infrastructure areas, assuming the education and training
capability exists/can be developed to support these competencies. This will need to be determined before preparing
the bid specification, as any significant training/involvement requirement of national staff by a vendor should be
included in the bid specification (in addition to any training requirements for operating staff).
An additional consideration is the extent to which national capability is to be embedded in particular
organizations or used as a shared resource. At one extreme, each organization (NEPIO, regulatory body, operating
organization) may be developed to have all the capabilities and resources it needs to fulfil its responsibilities
employed within that organization, making those organizations more self-sufficient, but at the cost of higher overall
resource requirements. At the other end of the spectrum, independent expert groups/organizations may be
developed/strengthened to provide technical support to the various responsible organizations, thus reducing the
overall resource requirements and alleviating the problem of retaining experts within each organization whose areas
of expertise are only needed periodically.
2.3. NUCLEAR SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
The decision of a country to embark on a nuclear power programme entails a long term commitment (of more
than a century) to the peaceful, safe and secure use of nuclear technology based on a sustainable organizational,
regulatory, social, technological and economic infrastructure. The need to maintain nuclear safety in operations and
the safety and security of nuclear materials, especially non-proliferation aspects, make nuclear energy unique
among the various energy options, and it is important for Member States to understand this from the outset. In this
respect, valuable guidance is provided in INSAG-22, Nuclear Safety Infrastructure for a National Nuclear Power
Programme [8]. Member States must understand, and be ready to commit to, the minimum international standards,
especially those for nuclear safety and security.
Experience has demonstrated that reliance on robust design and engineered safety systems alone is
insufficient to ensure nuclear safety [8]. Safe operation and the safe and secure handling and storage of nuclear
materials are core competencies required by any Member State developing a nuclear energy programme, and the
responsibility for safety cannot be delegated to another country or organization. Even the operational phase of a
successful NPP is likely to span at least two generations of the workforce, so ongoing, integrated workforce
planning is essential for safety. An NPP is operated by people, and thus the achievement of safety requires qualified
managerial and operating personnel working professionally, to the highest standards, within an appropriate
integrated management system. Commitment to nuclear safety is required by all elements of the government,
regulatory, vendor and operating organizations, and it is important that these organizations establish the appropriate
safety culture and standards from the outset of the programme.
2.4. IMPACT OF THE REGULATORY APPROACH
Key among the requirements to ensure nuclear safety is the establishment of a robust national legal and
regulatory framework, including the creation of a competent, independent regulatory body to oversee the
implementation and management of this framework. In terms of workforce planning, the approach to regulation
adopted by the Member State may have a significant impact on both the size and the competence requirements of
the regulatory body itself, as well as on the size of the operating organization.
The more proscriptive the regulatory framework is, the more resources are likely to be needed by the
regulatory body (either as permanent staff or external support). Conversely, if the regulatory framework makes the
8
operating organization primarily responsible for demonstrating compliance with requirements, then the operating
organization may need more resources to achieve this.
Specific aspects of the legal and regulatory framework, such as working hours/shift working limits, use of
local labour and limitations on the use of external experts, may also have a direct impact on resource requirements
(e.g. the decision of whether to operate a plant with five, six or seven teams of shift personnel has a significant
impact on the number of operating staff needed).
2.5. FIRST NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
It is generally accepted that the best practice to be adopted for the construction of a first NPP is that of a
turnkey contract (at least for the ‘nuclear island’; the Member State may have capability for the conventional plant
and civil works), whereby a suitably proven design is implemented by an established vendor, with the Member
State relying on international expertise and support organizations, such as the IAEA, the World Association of
Nuclear Operators and reactor owners’ groups, to support the various national stakeholders (Ministries, regulatory
bodies, implementing organizations, internal suppliers, etc.) in fulfilling their obligations within the project, even if
the longer term goal is to be self-sufficient. In situations where only one or two NPPs are to be constructed, as
indicated previously, even some of the core functions may initially be provided/supported by external expertise
(e.g. provision of technical support for regulation by the regulator from the country of origin of the design being
implemented). However, even in this case, the Member State must have/develop the competence to be an
‘intelligent customer’ for this support. In addition, the Member State is likely to retain responsibility for a number
of supporting infrastructure activities, such as grid enhancements, roads, housing and other facilities close to the
site. In any event, it is the responsibility of the Member State, over time, to acquire nationally the competencies
necessary to ensure the safe operation of the plant throughout its entire life cycle. There are also commercial
considerations in terms of the risk of the ongoing viability of the main vendor/key component suppliers.
Whatever the case, it is necessary to develop a detailed workforce plan at an early stage to identify the level
of resources and range of competencies needed for the various stages of the programme. Part of this planning
process will be to identify what the existing national competencies are, how they can be best utilized/further
developed and which new competencies can be acquired nationally, within the framework of the turnkey contract,
so that agreed national recruitment, training and development requirements can be built into overall project plans
and contracts. It is important at this point that Member States are realistic about their national technology base and
capability to develop and maintain the competencies required, even with international support. Inputs for the
national workforce plan will be needed from all relevant government departments, regulatory agencies, existing
utility operators, national industry, the education and training sector, and any other stakeholders identified as having
a role to play in the realization of a nuclear energy capability, each of which should be developing and maintaining
their own plans.
3. ANALYSIS OF INFRASTRUCTURE ACTIVITIES,
COMPETENCIES AND RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
As indicated earlier, a prerequisite for developing a workforce plan to support a national nuclear power
programme is to clearly define in Phase 1 (considering the feasibility of nuclear power for the country) the roles,
responsibilities and functions of all the stakeholder organizations to be involved. As the programme progresses into
Phase 2, this is likely to include, as a minimum, the NEPIO, an independent regulatory body and a designated
operating organization. The workforce planning process can then be used to identify the major activities that need
to be undertaken to achieve the milestones, which organizations should be responsible for these activities, and the
competencies needed. A part of this process will be to determine which of these activities are within the current
9
national capability, which could be undertaken nationally in the longer term (with training and support) and which
should be contracted out from the outset.
In addition to the nuclear related activities of a nuclear energy programme, as with all major capital projects,
significant non-nuclear resources will be needed, particularly in the early construction stages of the programme. For
general guidance on workforce development for the implementation of a nuclear energy programme, Member
States may find the IAEA publication on Manpower Development for Nuclear Power: A Guidebook [9] useful.
Although this publication, issued in 1980, was based on the previous generation of nuclear energy programmes,
much of the content is still relevant. For more detailed workforce planning, the main IAEA publications providing
useful guidance are listed in Table 6 at the end of this section, indicating those organizations and the phases to
which they are most applicable.
The workforce planning process for a specific nuclear energy programme should begin with a review of the
activities identified under each of the 19 infrastructure issues, phase by phase (as identified in Ref. [1]), which
should form the basis for an initial analysis of competence and resource needs. It is important to remember,
however, that although the infrastructure issues have been separated into 19 discrete topics, in reality the activities
associated with these topics are often integrated and interdependent. The same individuals may be engaged in
various activities covering several infrastructure issues. Hence, for workforce planning purposes, it is more
appropriate to consider these activities in terms of organizational responsibilities. In some cases, it is clear where
responsibilities should be assigned for particular activities; in others, it will be a judgement based on the particular
national organizational arrangements.
During Phase 1, the NEPIO is likely be the major responsible organization and, in addition to the information
contained in the Milestones publication, an overview of its functions and responsibilities during Phase 1 is provided
in Table 2, taken from Ref. [2].
During Phase 2, the regulatory body and operating organization will be assigned (assuming they were not
already assigned in Phase 1), and responsibilities, and therefore resource requirements, will progressively be
transferred to these organizations. Table 3 [2] provides an overview of the NEPIO’s functions and responsibilities
during Phase 2, and a similar overview of the responsibilities of the operating organization during Phase 2 is
included in Table 4 (taken from Ref. [3]). Useful sources when developing workforce plans for the regulatory body
include Organization and Staffing of the Regulatory Body for Nuclear Facilities [10] and Training the Staff of the
Regulatory Body for Nuclear Facilities: A Competency Framework [11].
TABLE 2. FUNCTIONS OF A NEPIO DURING PHASE 1
National position Provide a recommendation for a national decision to undertake (or not undertake) a nuclear power
programme based on a comprehensive understanding of the long term commitments inherent in such a
programme. This recommendation should be supported by a comprehensive report covering all areas
identified in Ref. [1] and recognizing the resources and timescales required for the activities to implement
Phase 2.
Nuclear safety Convey the importance of clearly recognizing that long term safety is a vital component of all activities
associated with the design, manufacture, construction, operation and maintenance of a nuclear facility,
decommissioning and commitments for spent fuel and waste management, and is best achieved by fostering
a strong safety culture in all organizations involved.
Management Provide a clear description of the scope and depth of management expertise needed within each organization
associated with the nuclear energy programme and a strategy to obtain or develop that expertise. Define the
form of the potential owner/operator and assist in building its capabilities. Make suggestions for allocations
on specific responsibilities of each organization associated with the nuclear programme.
Funding and financinga Design a strategy for funding the development of relevant institutional organizations (such as the regulatory
body) and financing specific NPP projects, including decommissioning and waste management. The
strategy may also include government funding in support of the nuclear power plant project itself, including
public financing.
10
Legislative framework Identify all legislation, including international legal instruments, required to be implemented or enhanced to
support a nuclear programme and a strategy for drafting and enacting it.
Safeguards Provide a plan covering the conclusion of a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) with the IAEA and
establishment of a State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC) with the relevant
authorities.
Provide a plan covering the drafting, implementation and enforcement of national legislation, policies and
procedures relevant to safeguards.
Regulatory framework Define the fundamental elements of an independent and effective nuclear regulatory body and a strategy to
create or enhance, fund and staff it.
Radiation protection Define the fundamental elements of a comprehensive radiation protection programme for all nuclear
activities and a strategy for implementing those elements within each organization.
Electrical grid Provide a comprehensive description of the grid size, configuration and reliability necessary to
accommodate the addition of an NPP and the likely extent and cost of grid enhancements that will be
needed.
Human resources
development
Describe the knowledge, skills and attitudes of multiple disciplines required for a nuclear programme and a
strategy for obtaining and maintaining the needed personnel.
Stakeholder involvement Conduct surveys of opinions on the application of nuclear power within the country, and plans for ongoing
education and consultation with identified stakeholders.
Site and supporting
facilities
Identify potential sites and conduct a preliminary assessment of suitability for the nuclear facilities’
construction and operation.
Environmental
protection
Assess the additional environmental considerations necessary for nuclear power, assessment of existing
environmental laws and regulations, and a strategy for their appropriate revision.
Emergency planning Describe the fundamental elements of emergency planning for nuclear facilities and the individual role of
each institution and organization.
Security and physical
protection
Describe the fundamental elements of security and physical protection programmes, and provide a
development strategy for these programmes.
Nuclear fuel cycle Develop an understanding of the long term nuclear fuel cycle commitments necessary for completing
realistic nuclear fuel cycle plans in Phase 2. Develop a strategy for obtaining a secure supply of fuel and the
appropriate national involvement in the individual steps of the nuclear fuel cycle, including availability of
natural resources, interim storage of spent fuel and longer term storage of spent fuel, taking into account
various fuel cycle options.
Radioactive waste Conduct an assessment of current capabilities for the handling and disposal of low level waste (LLW) and
intermediate level waste (ILW), a strategy for handling the additional volume associated with nuclear
facility operation and a strategy for determining the approach to the ultimate disposal of high level nuclear
waste or spent fuel.
Industrial involvement Conduct an assessment of local industrial capability and a strategy for developing the desired degree of
localization of industrial involvement or support for the planned NPP projects.
Procurement Design a strategy for procuring the equipment and services to support an NPP project, taking into account
the need for bilateral agreements with foreign suppliers and quality requirements for both international and
local suppliers.
a Funding is considered to be financial resources provided without recourse, usually by the government. Financing is commercially
provided.
TABLE 2. FUNCTIONS OF A NEPIO DURING PHASE 1 (cont.)
11
TABLE 3. FUNCTIONS OF A NEPIO DURING PHASE 2
National position Coordinate the government activities, inter alia, to implement the necessary laws and international
agreements, to establish policies and responsibilities for the long term issues and the independent regulatory
body, and to continue to fund and support the nuclear infrastructure development. Coordinate technology
strategy development and its implications among impacted organizations.
Nuclear safety Work to ensure that the responsibilities for nuclear safety are clearly established in law and that all
participating organizations are aware of their safety responsibilities and foster establishment of an
appropriate culture and activities in all involved organizations.
Management Coordinate promotional, operational, oversight and support activities, and monitor the creation and staffing
of the independent regulatory body and of the owner/operator organization, and the readiness to prepare for
bids and licensing procedures.
Funding and financing Work with the government to encourage adequate funding for infrastructure development and with the
government and the owner/operator to develop a realistic financing plan for the first NPP.
Legislative framework Monitor the country’s process for implementing a comprehensive legal framework.
Safeguards Confirm that a CSA with associated subsidiary arrangements is in force with the IAEA. Confirm that an
SSAC has been established and that early safeguards related information has been provided to the IAEA.
Regulatory framework Confirm that the independent regulatory body is established and staffed, has developed a licensing process,
including appropriate regulations, codes and standards, and is prepared to review and license sites and
reactor designs.
Radiation protection Confirm the development and implementation of applicable laws, regulations and programmes by the
government, the regulatory body and the owner/operator of formal radiation protection programmes.
Electrical grid Confirm the development of necessary plans, schedules and funding of grid enhancements by the grid owner
and/or the owner/operator to accommodate the addition of an NPP.
Human resources
development
Confirm that all organizations have obtained the human resources necessary to carry out their functions at
Milestone 2, and that programmes and plans are in place to develop, retain and replace human resources
consistent with the country’s plans for construction, operation, maintenance and support of the future NPP
and associated nuclear activities.
Stakeholder involvement Confirm that the government, the regulatory body and the owner/operator have developed and are
implementing programmes for public education and stakeholder involvement at all appropriate steps in the
nuclear power programme development process.
Site and supporting
facilities
Confirm that the owner/operator has identified, secured and characterized one or more suitable sites and that
the site characteristics are included in the bid specifications.
Environmental protection Confirm that enhancements to environmental law have been made and the responsibilities for environmental
approval and oversight have been formally assigned.
Emergency planning Confirm that the government has enacted the necessary laws, that the regulatory body has developed
regulations and that the owner/operator is developing the appropriate emergency plans and protocols with
local and national authorities.
Security and physical
protection
Confirm that the appropriate laws, regulations, protocols and programmes have been established by the
government, regulatory body and owner/operator for the security and protection of all nuclear materials and
facilities.
Nuclear fuel cycle Confirm that nuclear fuel cycle planning and strategy covers both the front and back ends of the fuel cycle
and that strategies for a secure supply of nuclear fuel and fuel services, and for on-site spent fuel storage
capacity, have been developed and are reflected in the owner/operator nuclear power plant bid request.
Confirm the existence of an integrated plan for bidding and constructing fuel cycle facilities consistent with
the power plant construction programme and national non-proliferation commitments.
12
Radioactive waste Confirm that the appropriate laws, regulations and facilities are in place or planned for handling,
transporting and storing LLW and ILW. In addition, assist the government in developing strategies and
policies with respect to eventual disposal of HLW and spent fuel.
Industrial involvement Confirm that the owner/operator, the regulatory body and designated industries are cooperating in
developing the industrial involvement envisioned by the country’s policies developed in Phase 1.
Procurement Confirm that the owner/operator has developed formal plans for procurement of the equipment and services
to support NPP operation and maintenance consistent with the country’s policies developed in Phase 1.
TABLE 4. TYPICAL FUNCTIONS OF THE OPERATING ORGANIZATION DURING PHASE 2
Issue Owner/operator responsibilities
National position — Create the owner/operating organization following the government decision.
Nuclear safety — Establish an appropriate internal system to identify its safety responsibilities based on the legislation in
force.
— Initiate the necessary actions to establish and continuously improve the safety culture across the
organization.
— Ensure that an understanding of nuclear safety requirements is developed in the entire supply chain.
— Together with the regulatory body, adhere to international legal instruments such as:
• The Convention on Nuclear Safety;
• The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident;
• The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its Amendment;
• The Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage;
• The Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.
Management — Establish a management system including an organizational chart of the owner/operator that is appropriate
for the main tasks of this phase, which are to prepare the BIS and start to build a safety culture;
— Ensure that the factors important for the development of a strong safety culture are considered throughout
this phase;
— Define the areas of competence to be established in the organization;
— Implement a programme of staff recruitment and training;
— Select the preferred NPP sites for the BIS;
— Determine the preferred nuclear technology (reactor and fuel type);
— Determine the fuel cycle and fuel procurement strategy;
— Determine the strategy for spent fuel and radioactive waste;
— Establish the preferred contractual approach (turnkey, split package, etc.);
— Develop the financial strategy and financial plan;
— Prepare the BIS, including the bid evaluation criteria;
— Establish efficient and effective working relationships with the regulatory bodies and similar relationships
with international and professional organizations;
— Start to build a project management organization to manage the construction of the first NPP.
Funding and financing — Develop a financing strategy and financial plan;
— Arrange the financing for the project in consultation with the government authorities and foreign and local
sources of finance.
Legislative framework — Establish the necessary interfaces with the government, regulatory bodies and national agencies;
— Understand the licensing process and the associated safety documentation.
TABLE 3. FUNCTIONS OF A NEPIO DURING PHASE 2 (cont.)
13
Safeguards — Consider a safeguards by design approach;
— Start to establish procedures and train staff to meet safeguards requirements, and to demonstrate to the
government authorities that this has been done;
— Submit the necessary preliminary design information related to safeguards to the IAEA through the
national regulator, according to the provisions set forth in the safeguards agreements;
— Consult with operators of the same type of facility on technical features for implementing safeguards (e.g.
installation of containment and surveillance devices, cabling, penetration of containment).
In safeguards terminology, the national regulator is the state authority for State systems of accounting for and
control of nuclear material (SSAC).
Regulatory framework — Set up an effective working relationship with the regulators, maintaining open communication;
— Ensure that other organizations that may be supplying goods or services to the NPP understand the national
safety requirements;
— Understand the safety regulations relevant to the bid process and be able to translate them into the bid
specification.
Radiation protection — Start to prepare a programme for radiation monitoring and radiation protection of the workforce, the public
and the environment;
— Perform the characterization of background sources of radiation at planned NPP sites in accordance with
the regulations.
Electrical grid — Provide information about the proposed NPP to the grid operator so that it can determine the necessary grid
enhancements and design them;
— Ensure that the proposed grid design would provide a sufficiently reliable grid connection and an adequate
external electrical supply to the NPP for reactor trip and shutdown conditions;
— Ensure that the possible schedule for grid enhancements is compatible with the likely schedule for
construction of the NPP;
— Include grid characteristics and requirements in the BIS.
Human resources
development
— Recruit and train the staff needed for Phase 2 responsibilities;
— Develop plans to recruit and train staff for Phase 3;
— Request that the government develop any needed enhancements to the country’s educational and research
institutions, and provide financial support if needed.
Stakeholder
involvement
— Prepare and implement the strategy for dealing with the public;
— Recruit experts in the areas of public communication and education, and train the NPP staff in these areas;
— Explain the basic technology being employed and the plans for the construction schedule;
— Openly discuss potential problems and difficulties, and plans to resolve them;
— Communicate transparently and professionally with other organizations participating in the nuclear power
programme;
— Demonstrate that it is a competent and credible organization that deserves the confidence of the public.
— Agree with local authorities near the NPP site on financial and technical support for social infrastructure
development;
— Open a public information centre near the NPP site and other places.
Site and supporting
facilities
— Carry out detailed site investigations of the possible sites for the NPP and recommend the preferred site or
sites;
— Secure the availability of the chosen site or sites;
— Identify local legal, political and public acceptance issues for the chosen site and plan for their resolution;
— Include the characteristics of the site in the BIS;
— Identify and plan any necessary improvements or upgrades to site characteristics and local infrastructure,
such as improved road access and water supply.
The candidate sites to be investigated may have been nominated or recommended by the government
following an initial investigation in Phase 1.
Environmental
protection
— Ensure that the necessary environmental impact assessment studies for the candidate sites are carried out;
— Submit the environmental impact assessment and the application for environmental clearance to the
environmental regulator;
— Include any special environmental features of the site in the BIS.
TABLE 4. TYPICAL FUNCTIONS OF THE OPERATING ORGANIZATION DURING PHASE 2 (cont.)
Issue Owner/operator responsibilities
14
From the beginning of Phase 3, the major workforce planning effort is likely to be focused on the operating
organization in order to adequately resource, first, the commissioning and, subsequently, the operation of the NPP.
Table 5 provides a summary of the responsibilities of the operating organization during Phase 3. The IAEA
publication Commissioning of Nuclear Power Plants: Training and Human Resource Considerations [12] contains
guidance for planning purposes. Inputs for workforce planning for the organizational and resourcing requirements
of the operating organization to actually operate the plant, will depend, to some extent, on the design of the NPP
selected. It is likely that the vendor of the chosen design will have recommendations in this area. Member States
may find broader guidance on the recruitment, training and qualification of these staff in Refs [13, 14].
Emergency planning — Identify the local and national organizations that will take part in emergency planning;
— Start to prepare the emergency plans and procedures.
Security and
physical protection
— Establish an interface with the responsible national agency (security regulator);
— Provide the inputs and expertise necessary to allow the security regulators and the concerned government
authorities to define the design basis threats (DBTs);
— Include security requirements in the BIS;
— Define the physical protection features of the NPP site;
— Introduce arrangements for security classification of the NPP data;
— Develop a programme for the selection and training of security staff.
Nuclear fuel cycle — Provide technical information to the government for nuclear fuel strategy;
— Reach agreement with the government for nuclear fuel strategy including fuel procurement and
management of spent nuclear fuel, particularly with regard to the national non-proliferation commitment
(the strategy for spent nuclear fuel includes whether or not to reprocess the fuel and the arrangements for
storage and disposal of spent fuel and/or HLW);
— Introduce specifications related to nuclear fuel in the BIS to define what should be procured separately;
— Submit through the national regulator to the IAEA the necessary safeguards related information according
to provisions set forth in the safeguards agreements.
Radioactive waste — Participate in the establishment of a radioactive waste management organization if no national agency
exists;
— Establish an interface with the radioactive waste management organization;
— Provide technical information to the waste management organization to allow the policy for waste disposal
to be established;
— Ensure that relevant procedures are created for implementing safeguards should the waste contain nuclear
material;
— Include specifications for minimization, handling, treatment, conditioning and storage of radioactive waste
in the BIS.
Industrial involvement — Carry out a realistic assessment of potential local suppliers of goods and services;
— Analyse the ability of local suppliers to meet the schedule and quality requirements, and provide input to
the government;
— Reach an agreement with the government for participation by local suppliers;
— Define local supplier participation in the BIS, including technology transfer requirements.
Procurement — Start to develop procurement management procedures and a quality assurance programme, including the
establishment of approved vendor lists;
— Start to establish the procurement team/department;
— Include specific requirements for goods and services procurement in the BIS in accordance with local
legislation.
TABLE 4. TYPICAL FUNCTIONS OF THE OPERATING ORGANIZATION DURING PHASE 2 (cont.)
Issue Owner/operator responsibilities
15
TABLE 5. TYPICAL FUNCTIONS OF THE OPERATING ORGANIZATION DURING PHASE 3
Issue Owner/operator responsibilities
National position — No direct responsibilities.
Nuclear safety — Ensure the continuation of management commitment to foster the development of a strong safety culture;
— Build and maintain technical knowledge and skills for the safe operation and maintenance of the NPP;
— Ensure that the other involved organizations (construction, engineering and any others that are external to the
owner/operator) understand and apply the national safety requirements and develop a strong safety culture;
— Ensure participation in the activities related to the international legal instruments.
Management — Issue the BIS to the bidders, including an identified site or sites;
— Evaluate the bids and choose the preferred bidder or bidders;
— Negotiate the contracts with a scope of supply consistent with the procurement strategy;
— Sign the contracts for the first NPP;
— Prepare technical documentation for the licensing application with contributions from the vendor or main
contractor (this should include a preliminary decommissioning plan);
— Submit the applications to the regulatory body for a site permit and a construction licence;
— Make suitable contractual arrangements with fuel and fuel service suppliers;
— Establish a team or department for public communication and information;
— Implement a management system and perform audits in order to ensure that all participants in the first NPP,
including subcontractors, meet the specific requirements (nuclear standards and codes, technical
specification, etc.);
— Train the operating personnel and arrange for them to be licensed if necessary.
Funding and financing — Determine the NPP project budget based on the agreed contract and owner/operator participation;
— Determine the required cash flow according to the NPP project schedule and contractual provisions
(payment milestones);
— Implement the financial plan based on the agreed contracts (loans, state funding, other financial
mechanisms);
— Follow the mechanism for provision of funding for the long term management of spent fuel and radioactive
waste and for decommissioning.
Legislative framework — Maintain the established interfaces with the government and different regulatory bodies, international
agencies (e.g. the IAEA) and national agencies in order to understand the legislation and comply with it.
Safeguards — Train staff to meet safeguards requirements and to demonstrate to the government authorities that this has
been done;
— Implement all safeguards measures and have the NPP safeguards system approved by the national
regulatory body before receipt of the first nuclear fuel on the NPP site;
— Provide to the national regulatory body or government the information on nuclear material subject to
safeguard instruments to be supplied to the IAEA in accordance with international conventions.
Regulatory framework — Maintain an effective working relationship and open communication with regulators;
— Agree with regulators on the programme/schedule for licensing meetings, taking into account the important
milestones of the first NPP construction schedule;
— Submit the safety documentation required in the licensing process in a timely manner, and be prepared to
respond to enquiries from the regulatory body;
— Require organizations in the supply chain to comply with national safety requirements.
Radiation protection — Implement all necessary radiation and environmental monitoring and protection programmes before the
first nuclear fuel load is transferred to the NPP site;
— Ensure all necessary services to implement the radiation protection programme using external
subcontractors (for calibration services, laboratory analysis, etc.) where appropriate;
— Develop the team/department and capabilities for safe implementation of radioactive waste management
activities before the first criticality.
16
Electrical grid — Agree with the grid operator on the schedule for grid upgrade projects to meet the NPP construction
schedule;
— Liaise with the grid operator during construction of grid upgrades and verify when they are complete;
— Establish with the grid operator all necessary agreements for future operation (e.g. electrical supply during
construction, licence for connection to the grid of the first NPP, etc.);
— Establish and agree on procedures for the coordination of grid operations with NPP operations.
Human resources
development
— Develop a human resources strategy for NPP operation, taking into account resources provided under the
contract with the vendor and the availability of other service providers;
— Recruit and train staff needed for NPP operation, maintenance and technical support, taking into account
the training provided under the contract with the vendor;
— Ensure that an adequate number of trained and certified staff/operators are available by the first fuel load;
— Develop plans for continuing recruitment and training of staff and personnel development for the lifetime
operation of the NPP.
Stakeholder
involvement
— Explain the technology being deployed in the NPP and the plans for construction activities;
— Routinely communicate progress during the construction phase and make preparations for operation;
— Openly discuss problems and difficulties encountered, and how to resolve them;
— Continually demonstrate that the owner/operator is a competent, transparent and credible organization that
deserves the confidence of the public.
Site and supporting
facilities
— Ensure that all site services (cooling water, electrical supply, offices, transport, lodging, communications,
roads, heating, etc.) are available and functioning when needed for construction or commissioning;
— Ensure that site security arrangements, environmental monitoring and emergency planning arrangements
are functioning correctly before the first fuel load arrives on site at the NPP.
Environmental
protection
— Complete the characterization of the site and its surroundings;
— Establish systems for monitoring and assessing all environmental releases from the NPP in accordance with
national laws and international standards, and implement all features before the first fuel load;
— Agree with the environmental regulator on the arrangements for independent measurements of
environmental releases from the NPP, if necessary;
— Agree with the environmental regulator on how information on releases from the NPP will be reported or
published.
Emergency planning — Finalize the emergency plan and put it into effect;
— Establish protocols and procedures for the interfaces with organizations involved in the emergency plan
(police, ambulances, transport, local and national government organizations, etc.);
— Arrange for systematic training of staff in the emergency service organizations so that they understand the
special issues that can affect nuclear sites;
— Perform emergency exercises at intervals jointly agreed by all the parties involved to ensure that the
arrangements are fully effective before the first fuel load arrives at the NPP site.
Security and physical
protection
— Set up a selection and qualification programme for the security staff;
— Ensure that security and physical protection systems and procedures are in place before the first fuel load
on the NPP site and obtain approval from competent authorities;
— Ensure that sufficiently trained security staff are available;
— Interface with national and local government bodies for security measures.
Nuclear fuel cycle — Place contract(s) for the first fuel load;
— Make contractual arrangements for future fuel reloads;
— Ensure that adequate storage capacity is constructed at the NPP site for interim storage of spent fuel;
— Ensure that the costs for long term storage and management of spent fuel are included in the operating costs
and funded in accordance with the legislation;
— Submit through the national regulator to the IAEA the necessary safeguards related information according
to provisions set forth in the safeguards agreement.
TABLE 5. TYPICAL FUNCTIONS OF THE OPERATING ORGANIZATION DURING PHASE 3 (cont.)
Issue Owner/operator responsibilities
17
Radioactive waste — Ensure that a fully operational facility for treatment, conditioning and storage of radioactive waste is
available at the NPP site by the first criticality;
— Ensure that the facility is able to produce a waste form that would be acceptable to the waste management
organization;
— Ensure that the costs for radioactive waste management and disposal are included in the operating costs and
funded in accordance with the legislation;
— Ensure that relevant procedures have been created for implementing safeguards should the waste contain
nuclear material.
Industrial involvement — Reassess potential local suppliers of goods and services during the contract negotiations based on the
specific vendor’s technical requirements;
— Specify in the contracts the final arrangements for the local supply of goods and services for the
construction period;
— Establish local supplier qualification requirements;
— Place the contracts for the procurement of the local supply in accordance with the NPP schedule, if
necessary;
— Supervise the fabrication of the goods by local suppliers in accordance with specific requirements, if
necessary.
Procurement — Establish a procurement programme that is consistent with national policy on industrial participation;
— Develop the capabilities to carry out procurement of full facilities, equipment and components for the NPP;
— Establish a suitable procurement organization that may be based at the NPP site or centrally in order to
provide the spares, consumables and services for future operation and maintenance of the NPP.
TABLE 6. SUMMARY OF KEY IAEA PUBLICATIONS RELATED TO WORKFORCE PLANNING
Responsible
organization
Relevant IAEA publication Phase
Ref. No. Title 1 2 3
NEPIO
NG-G-3.1 Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power   
NG-T-3.6 Responsibilities and Capabilities of a Nuclear Energy Programme Implementing
Organization
 
Regulatory body
GS-R-1 Legal and Governmental Infrastructure for Nuclear, Radiation, Radioactive Waste
and Transport Safety   
GS-G-1.1 Organization and Staffing of the Regulatory Body for Nuclear Facilities   
GS-G-1.2 Review and Assessment of Nuclear Facilities by the Regulatory Body  
GS-G-1.3 Regulatory Inspection of Nuclear Facilities and Enforcement by the Regulatory Body  
TECDOC-1254 Training the Staff of the Regulatory Body for Nuclear Facilities: A Competency
Framework  
TABLE 5. TYPICAL FUNCTIONS OF THE OPERATING ORGANIZATION DURING PHASE 3 (cont.)
Issue Owner/operator responsibilities
18
4. DEVELOPING A WORKFORCE PLAN
Summarizing the foregoing, for every country developing a nuclear energy programme, the workforce plans
will be different, based on factors such as:
—Scope (and main purpose) of the construction build programme;
—Nature of construction build programme (fully turnkey versus transition to indigenous construction) and
subsequent relationship with the vendor;
—Availability of nuclear expertise from non-energy applications (industry, medical, agriculture, applied
sciences);
—Access to available international nuclear expertise;
—Existing (if any) nuclear educational programmes;
—Availability and quality of non-nuclear workforce.
The quantity and variety of resources needed to establish a nuclear energy programme can be phased in over
the development of the programme and can begin with quite small numbers. For example, the owner/operator
project team needed to manage the specification and contracting of the first NPP during Phase 2 may be as few as
30–35 personnel (assuming a turnkey project where the supplier has overall responsibility for management of
construction and commissioning).
4.1. OVERVIEW
Workforce planning is an essential, ongoing human resources management process. Each organization
involved in the nuclear energy programme should develop and maintain its own workforce plan; at least for
Phases 1 and 2, the NEPIO should maintain an overall plan to enable an integrated national approach to resource
utilization and development. In developing the national workforce plan, it is important to gain an understanding of
how the workflow, and therefore the required resources and associated competencies, evolve as the programme
develops:
—During Phase 1, the NEPIO will be responsible for most of the activities being undertaken. The number of
staff involved will be relatively small and individuals may be drawn from various government departments,
with much of the actual specialist work being done by external experts/expert groups. The work to be
Operating
organization
NG-T-3.1 Initiating Nuclear Power Programmes: Responsibilities and Capabilities of Owners
and Operators   
NG-T-2.2 Commissioning of Nuclear Power Plants: Training and Human Resource
Considerations 
NS-G-2.4 The Operating Organization for Nuclear Power Plants  
NS-G-2.8 Recruitment, Qualification and Training of Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants  
TRS 380 Manpower Development for Nuclear Power — A Guidebook  
NG-G-2.1 Managing Human Resources in the Field of Nuclear Energy  
TABLE 6. SUMMARY OF KEY IAEA PUBLICATIONS RELATED TO WORKFORCE PLANNING (cont.)
Responsible
organization
Relevant IAEA publication Phase
Ref. No. Title 1 2 3
19
undertaken during Phase 1 will range from the development of recommendations concerning national policy
in some areas through to more detailed analysis in others. Thus, some staff will be working at quite a high
level, while others will be involved in more detailed activities (as stated earlier, Ref. [2] deals with the
establishment and specific responsibilities of the NEPIO).
—At the beginning of Phase 2, the NEPIO will still be driving the programme, but the other key responsible
organizations, including the regulatory body and the owner/operating organization, should be fully
established and taking an increasingly active role. The core project team for the construction of the plant
should be in place, as even at this early stage there will be a wide variety of activities to be managed, and early
recruitment of those operations staff with long training lead times (see Section 5.4) should be under way.
Towards the end of Phase 2, the NEPIO should have handed over many of its early responsibilities to the
various responsible organizations and may indeed be considered to have completed its responsibilities.
—By the beginning of Phase 3, although the NEPIO may still have an oversight/coordination role, especially if
the first NPP is part of a bigger programme, primary responsibility for management of NPP construction and
commissioning should be with the operating organization. The regulatory body will be actively engaged in the
licensing of the site and plant design as well as overseeing manufacturing and construction, as appropriate.
The operating organization will be actively recruiting and managing the training of its permanent plant staff.
This profile of resource requirements is illustrated in Fig. 3. From an education/qualification perspective,
during Phases 1 and 2 of infrastructure development, the majority of the core staff needed will be at the
professional/graduate level. However, when staffing the NPP for the operations phase, the graduate component is
generally the minority part of the total workforce, with the majority of the workforce being ‘technician’ level staff
(i.e. staff who may only have high school level educational qualifications, coupled with some form of vocational
skill certification and/or apprenticeship. These staff will require less ‘nuclear’ knowledge than their graduate
counterparts but will need considerable training in order to understand the quality and safety requirements of
working in a nuclear environment and why nuclear is different from other engineering and industrial environments.
0
200
400
600
800
1000
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Years (Indicative only)
No. of people
NEPIO REG BODY OP ORG
<----------------- Phase 3 ---------------->
Design, Construct, Comm'n
Commissioning
<-- Phase 1-->
<-------- Phase 2-------->
Site Investigation, Bid
Preparations
MS1 MS2 MS3
Multi Units
1Unit
1Unit
Multi Units
FIG. 3. Typical phasing of resource requirements.
20
4.2. RECRUITMENT CONSIDERATIONS
Even where there are no readily available resources with nuclear experience within the country, there are
many opportunities for quickly accessing/developing such expertise, examples of which include:
—Attracting expatriate personnel who have worked in the nuclear sector abroad.
—Attracting experienced foreign personnel with appropriate remuneration packages, either as employees
(if permitted by national labour laws/regulations) or as consultants. Such personnel can be a driving force in
the development of the core national staff through coaching/mentoring and training.
—Recruiting experienced personnel from appropriate national industries, such as the fossil fired power
generation, the process/production industries and the oil and gas industries, who will already have many of
the required competencies to work in the nuclear industry.
In attempting to recruit expertise from overseas, it is important to recognize that this can be a two-way
process. The nuclear community is currently truly global in nature, and this is unlikely to change in the near future;
indeed, with the current upsurge in the prospect of new builds, the global demand for resources is likely to rise
steeply. Hence, there is a high risk that indigenously trained personnel may be attracted to overseas opportunities,
especially in more developed countries where salaries and living standards may be much higher than at home. An
important element of the workforce planning strategy will therefore be the use of appropriate tools to monitor the
engagement/satisfaction of employees, and to ensure that compensation packages are competitive with other
opportunities nationally and, where possible, internationally. In any event, it would be prudent to build some
redundancy into staff recruitment and training programmes to allow for these losses.
Another specific consideration is that of language. In many examples, when a country is constructing its first
NPP, the project language and associated documentation has initially been in English, or another foreign language,
sometimes with a transition into the national language at some time after the start of the NPP operation. This may
be a factor in recruitment, and certainly the use of a project glossary to assist all parties concerned is recommended.
It may also be necessary to consider allotting more time for additional training requirements (including language
training) in workforce plans.
5. CONSIDERATIONS FOR STAFFING
A NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAMME
5.1. OVERALL APPROACH
National recruitment processes and practices vary from country to country and may have a significant impact
on the workforce planning process. However, nuclear energy programmes require staff of the highest calibre, and it
is common practice for educational and/or qualification/licensing requirements to specified by the regulatory body,
at least for certain safety related roles. It may therefore be necessary to implement a specific process for the
recruitment of staff. Depending on the national education capability, some organizations are able to recruit their
professional talent directly at the graduate level by a competitive process that may result in several hundred
candidates applying for one or more jobs. This then requires screening to select perhaps 6–10 candidates for
interview, which is a time consuming and resource intensive process. At the other extreme, some countries establish
nuclear ‘academies’ or universities and select students directly from secondary education with the expectation that
the vast majority of ‘graduates’ from these establishments will be employed directly by the industry, thereby
simplifying the ‘recruitment’ process.
It is good practice to set limits on the duration of the recruitment process, from the announcement of a job
opportunity to the day of appointment. This might be days or months, depending on whether the job is at a support
staff or professional level, but it sets expectations on the part of both the recruiting organization and the applicants.
21
Another important consideration related to the duration of the recruitment process is the scope and duration of
any job related training considered necessary prior to an individual’s being authorized to undertake his or her
allocated duties. This may range from a few weeks of familiarization for an experienced technical specialist
working narrowly within his or her field to several years for a plant operator who may only have secondary
education level qualifications.
Hence, for some positions (e.g. operations, reactor engineering, radiological safety and training), it will be
necessary to begin the recruitment process several years prior to the individual’s being needed to undertake his or
her duties, even prior to signing the contract for the plant.
In an area where several Member States are considering implementing a nuclear energy programme, one
practical approach might be to establish a regional training centre (RTC), thus sharing the burden as well as the
benefits of specialist nuclear training among several Member States. There are a number of potential benefits in
developing an RTC, including:
—Set-up as well as running costs are shared between several Member States.
—An RTC avoids competition between individual Member States in trying to attract scarce specialist resources
to provide nuclear training.
—RTCs are more likely to attract the support of international organizations, such as the IAEA, and are more
likely to be able to establish links/partnerships with other international training/educational institutions,
operating organizations and suppliers.
—Member States may be less likely to lose staff to neighbouring countries if the whole region has adequate
access to such specialist training resources.
Such RTCs where staff can receive training would be particularly beneficial during the early phases of a
nuclear energy programme, before there is an operating NPP or even an NPP construction project.
An essential element of developing competence is the need to gain practical training and experience. Some
elements of this are discussed in the next section, but, inevitably, it will be necessary to find a means of placing
some personnel within existing nuclear operating organizations. The existence of an RTC and the possibility of such
a facility establishing international links may also be of benefit in this respect.
5.2. PHASE 1
The initial resourcing of Phase 1 presents a major challenge in workforce planning, as a Member State is
unlikely to have all or even many of the needed competencies, particularly those relating to nuclear power. Even
starting with a zero baseline, the staff required for Phase 2 will have had the opportunity to develop their initial
competence during Phase 1, and similarly for Phase 3. Hence, building competence during Phase 1 is vital for the
success of the subsequent phases. An essential component of building that competence is giving staff real
experience at the earliest possible opportunity.
One way of providing staff with the opportunity to gain experience during Phase 1 is to adopt a combined
approach of importing international expertise to support the overall programme, while at the same time placing
national staff overseas to gain experience. This approach may usefully be adopted by all responsible organizations:
the NEPIO, regulatory body, operating organization, national industrial organizations hoping to participate in the
manufacturing and/or construction of the plant, academic institutions involved in the development of national
capability in the medium to long term, and those scientific/research and technical support organizations which may
provide services to the plant throughout its life cycle.
External expertise has been successfully used in a number of different ways, for example:
—Contracting out whole work packages to experienced consultants, but including requirements to utilize/train
national staff in delivering the work package (where little or no national competence exists in the particular
area);
—Contracting with consultants to become ‘temporary’ staff working with nationals to deliver work packages,
adding value in the more complex areas while developing national staff (where a modest level of competence
exists);
22
—Engaging senior consultants to ‘coach’ national staff in specific areas of competence (where a higher level of
national capability exists);
—Organizing national conferences/workshops where vendors and specialist support organizations can present
their capabilities and services (care needs to be taken to ensure that no suggestion of preference or
commitment to future business is implied).
Similarly, there are a variety of ways in which staff can be given the opportunity to build competence and
experience overseas:
—Establishing bilateral and multilateral relationships with governments, regulatory agencies, vendors, utilities,
educational institutions and others, which allow for placements and staff ‘swapping’;
—IAEA training courses, fellowships and internships;
—Formal courses of overseas study (e.g. vocational, undergraduate and postgraduate programmes, which may
include industry assignments) and training (directly with utilities/national nuclear training organizations);
—Building staff training and development assignments into potential contracts with vendors, consultants,
service providers, etc.;
—Developing ‘strategic alliances’ with vendors/equipment suppliers whereby national organizations obtain
licenses to manufacture components in-country, which can include training and qualification in the country of
origin.
Fortunately, the number of staff directly involved in Phase 1 is relatively small, maybe only 20–30 people,
although this number would require the additional support of expert groups, either nationally or internationally.
Most, if not all, of these staff will be within the NEPIO, and these staff are likely to be heavily supported by
national/international expertise. An example of how this group might be organized is illustrated in Fig. 4.
If a Member State has an existing regulatory body for non-energy applications, this group can be used to
undertake the initial work relating to the establishment/revision of legal and regulatory requirements for nuclear
energy during Phase 1, even if a separate regulatory body for nuclear energy is to be established in due course.
While it may be difficult to make any long term staffing decisions prior to a formal decision on whether to
proceed with a nuclear energy programme at Milestone 1, due to the constraints of the recruitment and training
requirements described above, consideration should be given to commencing recruitment of some key staff during
Phase 1, to be available for work in Phase 2.
Environmental assessment &
siting team
Economic & technology
localization assessment team
Responsible Minister
Director of NEPIO
Legal & regulatory
team
Public information &
public consultation officer
Electric market & generation
mix assessment team
NPP technology &
fuel cycle assessment team
Technical, commercial &
policy consultants
FIG. 4. Example of the organization of a NEPIO in Phase 1.
23
5.3. PHASE 2
This will be a very busy and diverse period in terms of workforce planning and staff recruitment, and so it is
easier to address each of the three main groupings separately.
NEPIO
The staffing of the NEPIO will peak during this phase, as can be seen in Fig. 5, typically in the range on
20–50 staff members, depending of the level of specialist support available. By the end of Phase 2, many of their
responsibilities should have been transferred to the other responsible organizations, especially the regulatory
body and the operating organization. Depending on the size of the nuclear energy programme, the NEPIO may
cease to exist as such (or its role may shift to one of purely coordination), with some of its oversight
responsibilities (and resources) being transferred to the appropriate regulatory agencies and others being placed
within those government departments which would normally be responsible for such activities. In addition,
based on the experience they have gained, key NEPIO staff may be transferred into senior positions in the
operating organization, either within the nuclear plant management structure (single NPP) or in the corporate
organization (multi-unit programme). It is important however that, even if the NEPIO ceases to exist as an
organization, the government continues to demonstrate its commitment to, and support for, the nuclear energy
programme, and that key individuals within the appropriate government departments have the authority and
responsibility to continue promoting the programme.
Regulatory body
The development of the work processes, human resources and competencies of the independent regulatory
body is a high priority task in Phase 2 and will continue through Phase 3. During Phase 2, the regulatory body will
be proposing and promulgating safety regulations and guides, as well as adopting appropriate industrial codes to
properly cover all foreseen nuclear activities.
0
100
200
300
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Years (Indicative only)
No. of people
<----------------- Phas e 3 ---------------->
Design, Cons truct, Comm'n
Commissioning
<-- Phas e 1-->
<-------- Phase 2-------->
Site Investigation, Bid
Preparations
MS1 MS2 MS3
NEPIO = 10 --> 50 (Depending on Expert Group Support and number size of programme)
FIG. 5. Example of phasing of resource requirements for a NEPIO.
24
The number of staff of the regulatory body will depend on two key factors:
—The number of organizations available to provide technical support to the regulatory body (Section 2.2);
—The regulatory approach adopted by the Member State (Section 2.4).
Typically, the regulatory body may have a core staff of about 40–60 people with the competencies to develop
or adopt safety regulations, develop and implement an authorization process, review and assess the safety and
design documentation provided by the operating organization against the adopted regulations, and inspect the
facility, the vendor and manufacturers of safety related components.
Peak numbers within the regulatory body may be higher, for example, up to 100–150 personnel, again
dependent on the level of specialist independent support available and on the number of NPPs planned (workload).
In the case of only one plant, these numbers should decline over commissioning, as illustrated in Fig. 6.
It is generally accepted that regulatory bodies should have competencies in four main areas:
—Legal basis and regulatory processes;
—Technical disciplines;
—Regulatory practices;
—Personal and interpersonal competencies.
Detailed guidance on the development of these competencies for regulatory body staff may be found in
Ref. [11], and the IAEA can provide assistance in this area.
Operating organization
Purely from an operational point of view, the planning and recruitment of the staff that will eventually operate
the plant needs careful consideration at an early stage in the programme for the following reasons:
—The number of staff required is much larger than for the other organizations, typically in the range of
500–1000 for a single or twin unit plant, up to several thousand for a multiple unit plant (see Section 5.4).
0
50
100
150
200
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Years (Indicative only)
No. of people
<-------------- Phase 3 -------------->
Design, Construct, Comm'n
Commissioning
<-- Phase 1-->
<-------- Phase 2-------->
Site Investigation, Bid
Preparations
MS1 MS2 MS3
FIG. 6. Phasing of resource requirements for the regulatory body.
25
—Many of the operating organization staff have safety related roles as described above, requiring authorization,
and hence have significant training programmes, required up to several years for completion (much of such
training may be initially conducted at reference plant(s) overseas).
—The commissioning of an NPP, especially if it is a country’s first plant, presents a unique opportunity for staff
to gain practical experience. For those staff with specific responsibilities during the commissioning phase,
their initial training must be completed. For other staff who do not have specific responsibilities, the
commissioning phase still provides opportunities to observe activities and gain practical experience. For these
staff to gain maximum benefit and to avoid resource conflict, at least initial classroom training should be
completed prior to the main commissioning phase. The IAEA publication Commissioning of Nuclear Power
Plants: Training and Human Resource Considerations [12] provides guidance in this area.
In addition, for a first NPP, there are many other activities to be carried out by the future operating
organization, such as:
—Preparing the BIS;
—Preparing the environmental impact assessment report (EIAR);
—Establishing interfaces with the various national and international bodies associated with safeguards, security,
physical protection, the nuclear fuel cycle and radioactive waste;
—Establishing the integrated management system needed to ensure the safe operation of the plant;
—Creating the foundations of an appropriate safety culture prior to commencing construction;
—Preparing a strategy for dealing with the public;
—Starting to prepare emergency plans and procedures;
—Other (see Ref. [3]).
In order to ensure that there are enough competent staff available for these activities, it will be necessary to
begin the recruitment and training of operating organization staff early in Phase 2 (see Fig. 7).
5.4. PHASE 3
By the beginning of Phase 3, the majority of NEPIO staff is likely to have either transferred to one of the other
responsible organizations or returned to one of the government departments with ongoing responsibility for the
nuclear energy programme. The majority of regulatory body staff should be in place, undertaking training and
discharging their responsibilities in respect of the licensing process.
A project team should be established within the operating organization and fully staffed and competent to
meet its responsibilities. This team will oversee the project on behalf of the Member State/operating organization,
as distinct from the vendor established project management team (PMT), which will manage the actual construction
of the NPP and which may include representatives of the operating organization [3]. It is recommended that this
team is part of the operating organization in order to retain their experience and expertise, although different
practices may be found in different countries. This also depends on the size of the nuclear energy programme. A key
issue here is to ensure that senior PMT staff are not also designated to be senior plant operations staff, as their
project management responsibilities during commissioning are likely to conflict with the opportunities for
operations staff to gain unique hands-on experience during the commissioning phase.
Plant staff
During this phase, the majority of the plant operating staff, especially technical staff, should be recruited and
fully trained. In reality, the actual staff numbers required will vary from plant to plant. This is even true in Member
States currently operating many NPPs. This can be for a variety of reasons, including:
—Stand-alone NPP or part of a fleet of NPPs with one operating organization and centralized support functions;
—Regulatory requirements specified by the Member State’s national nuclear regulator;
—Regulatory requirements specified within the Member State by provincial regulators;
26
—Minor differences in design, even on twin/multi-unit sites;
—Concept of operations, including the level of plant automation and control, and approach to maintenance
(in-house staff, joint maintenance by operating utility staff or external contractors);
—Physical attributes of the NPP — physical layout of plant systems/equipment;
—Local labour conditions;
—National/local laws/regulations on labour and employment practices;
—Support relationships with vendors/suppliers.
To give readers of this publication a better understanding of the staffing needed by the end of Phase 3 for the
operating organization (the largest of the nuclear organizations to be established), Appendix I provides an example
of the median staffing levels by function for some 67 one-unit and two-unit NPPs in operation in North America
and western Europe (see notes in the appendix), giving totals of approximately 700 for a single unit plant and 1000
for a twin unit. A description of each of the functions is included in Appendix II for clarity. It must be emphasized
that these figures are presented as examples only, as actual numbers will depend on many factors, including those
listed above.
It should be emphasized that these numbers relate to direct plant staff only. If more than one NPP is to be built,
it is likely that a central or ‘headquarters’ function will be established with its own resource requirements, which in
turn may impact the numbers required on each unit if some of the functions are centralized (e.g. design authority,
technical support, maintenance, finance, procurement). Additional comparative data on staffing numbers can be
found in Ref. [15].
The phasing of recruitment of plant staff depends greatly on their training lead times (how long they need for
formal training prior to authorization/certification for their duties), and these vary greatly, depending on their roles
and responsibilities. Figure 7 provides an example of the phasing of recruitment in years before commissioning,
based on the totals given above. An example breakdown of qualification and training requirements (including
typical training lead times, based on the stated expected entry-level education requirements) for various functions at
a typical US NPP is included in Appendix III. The reader is cautioned that such lead times will vary considerably
based upon national norms and regulations regarding factors such as education, vocational training, labour laws and
practices, and industry practices. This variability underlines the need for each country to analyse its own situation
and needs through its detailed workforce planning.
0
200
400
600
800
1000
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Ye ars (Indicative only) No. of people
<---------------- Phas e 3 ---------------->
Des ign, Construct, Comm'n
Commissioning
<-- Phase 1 -->
<--------- Phase 2---------->
Site Investigation, Bid
Preparations
<-----Op Training----
MS1 MS2 MS3
FIG. 7. Buildup of plant staff prior to commissioning.
27
In terms of staffing a first nuclear plant, a number of options have been used, including:
—Initial operation by a national staff, which is already trained by the vendor but under the supervision of an
experienced vendor supplied staff for an initial period;
—An initial period of operation staffed by the turnkey contractor’s staff while training the main body of the
national staff, with a subsequent formal handover to the operating organization after a period of one to three
years;
—A mixture of experienced and newly trained staff in appropriate positions (e.g. for early Chinese NPPs,
approximately one-third of the staff were taken from other plants, one-third from research reactors and
one-third from their ‘nuclear’ university).
5.5. POST–PHASE 3 (OPERATIONS, DECOMMISSIONING)
The completion of commissioning of the NPP marks the beginning of what should be, by current norms, a
40–60 year operating phase, followed eventually by decommissioning. Throughout this period of operations,
specialist support (including research and development) will be needed for a variety of activities, for example:
—Periodic routine maintenance;
—In-service inspection (ISI) and other non-destructive testing (NDT) activities;
—Refurbishment/replacement of obsolete systems/components;
—Upgrading of reactor/turbine power output;
—Development of the case and implementation of the necessary enhancements to extend the operating life of
the plant (life extension).
The same can also be said for the decommissioning phase of the NPP. While the vendor and/or other specialist
external contractors already exist to provide such support, and the timescales for the development of such national
capability are longer, decisions need to be taken at an early stage concerning the extent of desired national
involvement in these activities in order to build any requirements into the national workforce plan and contract
tender requirements as appropriate. Some aspects of this are discussed in more detail in the next section.
6. THE ROLE OF SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS
6.1. EDUCATION/RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTIONS
While it is advantageous to have an existing national nuclear engineering education/research infrastructure,
this is not a prerequisite to begin a nuclear energy programme. What is necessary is to have a good general
engineering (electrical, mechanical, control, process, etc.) and physics education infrastructure, producing high
calibre graduates, who can then be trained on appropriate nuclear specifics either within the industry, in cooperation
with other training or academic providers, or even as part of the turnkey contract by the vendor.
In Section 5.1, the concept of a regional training centre (RTC) was introduced. Should this option not be
feasible, a Member State should consider establishing its own nuclear training centre (NTC) to provide the
necessary link between the nuclear ‘education’ provided by universities and technical schools and the specific
knowledge, skills, attitudes and experience required to develop the competence to work at an NPP. Such an NTC
could be operated by the government, the owner/operator or an independent organization but could have links with
appropriate universities to provide teaching support and specialist lectures within the training centre as described,
for example, in the Daya Bay case study in Appendix V.
If a nuclear research capability already exists within the Member State, then it is important, as far as
practicable, to align the activities of the education/research institutions and the nuclear energy programme to try to
28
achieve a beneficial balance between academic rigour and industry oriented application. Such established research
activities may provide a good source of expertise for the nuclear energy programme.
One of the benefits of an industry based postgraduate nuclear training programme is that the education and
training can be of a much more ‘applied’ nature based on planned/actual designs being implemented and can be
targeted at specific areas of activity (e.g. operations, engineering, maintenance, reactor performance).
If a strong undergraduate/postgraduate nuclear engineering education infrastructure does not already exist,
but it is planned to build one as part of a national nuclear energy programme, it is important that both industry and
academic institutions work closely to develop such programmes to ensure that they are practical and oriented to the
national need.
When considering the development of the nuclear workforce, it is important not only to focus on the
graduate/postgraduate sector but also to consider the vocational requirements of regulators and operating
organizations. Experience shows that typically more than 50% of the workforce at an NPP may be technical staff
with vocational qualifications and usually trained in technical schools, which rarely have nuclear specific
programmes. This sector of the workforce is often recruited relatively local to the NPP (which helps to foster local
support for the NPP), and so Member States should work closely with and endeavour to support those technical
schools close to any sites being considered for an NPP. Regional or national training centres, as already described
above, would play an important role in the training of these staff.
An important element of any relationship between the nuclear industry and any education or especially
training institutions is the adoption of a systematic approach to training (SAT) to ensure that any education and
training programmes proposed meet the needs of the industry. Establishing SAT at an early stage in the project will
help to ensure that an effective training system is established within the project and that those areas where training
services and support can be appropriately outsourced to vendors and/or national education and training
organizations are correctly identified. The IAEA has extensive guidance on establishing and implementing SAT,
and references are included in the Bibliography.
For the nuclear industry, there are many benefits to be gained from cooperating with educational institutions,
including:
—The opportunity to shape undergraduate programme curricula to achieve a balance between the needs of
industry and academic demands;
—Access to students in order to promote a career in the nuclear industry as an option for undergraduates;
—An opportunity to sponsor and give experience to the best undergraduates to encourage them to join the
industry upon graduation.
There are a number of actions that the nuclear industry can take to help to develop and foster these
relationships. These include such activities as:
—Providing work placement opportunities whereby students can gain experience in the various organizations
(operating organization, regulatory body, support organizations) for a period from a few weeks up to a year to
gain insight and experience in the organizations. Many Member States have undergraduate programmes that
require students to work in the industry for a year during their studies in order to gain real experience in the
field of their studies.
—Providing support for/funding an appropriate ‘Chair’ or Head of Faculty position (e.g. engineering, physics,
nuclear sciences) at one of the better engineering universities.
—Funding relevant research such as material studies, fatigue mechanisms, diagnostic techniques, etc.; this will
be of real benefit to the nuclear industry while at the same time attracting and encouraging high quality
academic staff who will support the undergraduate and postgraduate programmes of the associated institution.
The level of national resource infrastructure building and the involvement of educational institutions to
support this activity will depend on factors similar to those influencing the workforce planning strategy, including:
—The size of the planned nuclear power programme and, accordingly, the extent of international support for the
planning, siting, design/reactor type, construction, commissioning and operation of the first NPP;
—The scope for international support (economic, political, etc.);
29
—The existing infrastructure, if any, to support non-power applications of nuclear energy (e.g. medicine,
industry and agriculture);
—The current national industrial and technological base and its potential for development.
Existing national educational institutions (EIs) can enhance the support they provide for the development of
human resources for the nuclear industry in a number of ways, such as by:
—Developing new or realigning existing nuclear engineering and science related degree curricula jointly with
the responsible organizations (NEPIO, regulatory body, operating organization, industrial partners, etc.) to
ensure alignment with future needs;
—Establishing working ‘councils’ with academic, government and industry representation to oversee the
development of nuclear science training and development programmes nationally;
—Using senior responsible organization staff as visiting lecturers on nuclear engineering programmes;
—Placing undergraduate students in the responsible organizations for work experience as part of their
undergraduate programme;
—Developing partnerships with EIs that have appropriate programmes in countries with mature nuclear power
programmes, using this relationship to develop new programmes or gain accreditation of existing
programmes;
—Developing fellowship or exchange programmes whereby national undergraduates get the opportunity to
pursue a portion of their studies in a country with a well developed nuclear power programme; similarly
exchange programmes could be established for lecturers to import international expertise while at the same
time broadening the experience of national staff;
—Utilizing available international assistance (e.g. IAEA programmes, World Nuclear University, regional
networks).
For EIs wishing to enhance the support they provide, particular attention should be paid to the selection and
training of lecturers on nuclear plant specifics such as nuclear safety, plant design and characteristics of the plant
equipment.
6.2. TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND R&D ORGANIZATIONS
Many Member States have exploited the establishment of a nuclear energy programme as a vehicle to
facilitate a wider technology transfer and to upgrade the national technological capability. While in the short term
the focus of the programme should be to establish nuclear energy in a timely and cost effective way, usually by a
turnkey approach as described earlier, there will be many opportunities for national organizations to provide
support in the longer term. Involvement of national organizations may even be specified within the turnkey
contract, provided they have the capability and resources to meet the requirement of the project.
Regarding nuclear power, both operating organizations and nuclear regulatory bodies in a number of Member
States have formal relationships with technical support organizations (TSOs) to provide them specialized
assistance, rather than maintaining such competencies within their own organizations. When initiating a nuclear
power programme, the use of such TSOs should be considered when developing a human resource development
strategy and supporting workforce plans. Technical Support for Nuclear Power Operations, IAEA-TECDOC-1078
[16], and IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-1, Legal and Governmental Infrastructure for Nuclear,
Radiation, Radioactive Waste and Transport Safety [17], provide further information regarding TSOs for operating
organizations and regulatory bodies, respectively. Some additional human resource issues for such organizations
are also addressed in Ref. [5], Appendix II.
A wide variety of support will be needed by the NPP throughout its life cycle, as outlined in Section 5.5, as
well as support for radioactive material (including fuel) handling, storage and disposal. An early decision on the
extent of/potential for national involvement in these activities is needed to determine the workforce planning
requirements for these areas.
30
The same issues of size and scope of the nuclear energy programme affecting the wider workforce planning
strategy and involvement of education and training organizations apply to technical support and R&D
organizations.
7. KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT FOR
NEW NUCLEAR POWER
7.1. NEED FOR NUCLEAR KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT
It is important to remember that, as indicated at the beginning of this publication, the introduction of a nuclear
energy programme involves a commitment of at least 100 years to cover the commissioning, operation and,
ultimately, decommissioning phases of an NPP (i.e. several generations of the workforce). Many experts around the
world are retiring, taking with them a lot of knowledge and corporate memory. Loss of employees who hold
knowledge that is critical to either operations or safety poses an internal threat to the safety and operations of NPPs.
Hence the issue of knowledge management, particularly knowledge about the design, construction and
commissioning of the plant, is critical. For many mature nuclear operating organizations with many years of reactor
operation, the need to manage knowledge for future generations was not recognized as a priority in the early years,
and these organizations are facing a major challenge with renewed support for nuclear power and the desire to
extend the lives of existing plants.
In IAEA-TECDOC-1510, Knowledge Management for Nuclear Industry Operating Organizations [18],
knowledge management is defined as an integrated, systematic approach to identifying, managing and sharing an
organization’s knowledge, and enabling persons to create new knowledge collectively in order to help achieve the
objectives of that organization.
Member States embarking on a new nuclear energy programme have the opportunity to establish effective
knowledge management systems and processes from the outset, with the added benefit of readily available hard and
software systems designed for that purpose. Early establishment of a knowledge management system is especially
important for turnkey contracts, where most of the necessary plant data will come from third parties and provision
must be made for inclusion of all data, in an easily accessible format, within any contract specifications.
7.2. BENEFITS OF KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT
Knowledge is the key resource of most organizations in today’s world. Managing knowledge effectively
requires understanding of and attention to the concept of organizational knowledge rather than just the traditional
notion of individual centred knowledge. This shift can be addressed through the utilization of organizational core
competencies that have proven themselves to be of value within many Member State organizations.
Knowledge management can be considered as a management philosophy in the same way as, for example,
quality management and risk management are. Many of these other philosophies have reached a level of maturity
whereby they are embedded in standard management practice. Nuclear knowledge management has not yet reached
this stage of maturity worldwide. The IAEA recommends a management system to promote and support nuclear
knowledge management as a primary opportunity for achieving competitive advantage and maintaining a high level
of safety. This approach ensures that organizations are able to demonstrate their long term competitiveness and
sustainability through actively managing their information and knowledge as a strategic resource that supports the
establishment and maintenance of safe, high level organizational performance. The requirement to manage
information and knowledge as a resource is an integral part of an operating organization’s management system [6].
Some additional information on aspects of knowledge management and steps to implement an effective
knowledge management system are included in Appendix IV, and additional IAEA publications containing
guidance on developing effective knowledge management systems and details are listed in the Bibliography.
31
8. SUMMARY: HOW TO GET STARTED
This section is intended to provide a very brief summary of the information provided in this publication,
presented in the form of an overview of how to get started on effectively including human resources development
when considering whether nuclear power is feasible for a Member State. This section is NOT intended to stand
alone but rather to serve as an overall road map for addressing workforce planning in the context of considering a
nuclear power programme (Phase 1 of the Milestones approach [1]).
The importance of recognizing workforce planning as an integral part of an organization’s human resource
development strategy and plans was emphasized in the introduction and is illustrated in Fig.1.
8.1. PREREQUISITES FOR WORKFORCE PLANNING (PHASE 1)
As stated previously, a prerequisite for effective workforce planning for a nuclear power programme is the
establishment of clear roles, responsibilities and functions for all of the organizations that will have a role in
considering a nuclear power programme. Absent these roles, responsibilities and functions, there is no
framework/basis for workforce planning. The establishment of a NEPIO as described in Ref. [2] is one way in
which to effectively develop these roles, responsibilities and functions, as well as to foster coordination among
those organizations involved in considering a nuclear power programme. However, these roles, responsibilities and
functions can certainly be determined without having a NEPIO in place.
8.2. KEY STEPS FOR WORKFORCE PLANNING IN THE CONTEXT OF A HUMAN RESOURCES
STRATEGY
It is recommended that the following activities related to workforce planning be implemented when getting
started (for Phases 1 and 2):
(1) Produce a brief (1 or 2 page) conceptual statement on human resources development for the nuclear
programme (to be developed during Phase 1 in support of a ‘road map’ for the nuclear power programme).
(2) Develop a human resources development strategy for the entire nuclear programme that considers all of the
areas identified in Fig. 1 to be included in the feasibility study (which is the principal output of Phase 1).
(3) Develop a workforce plan for all activities to be conducted during Phase 1 and for those expected to be
performed in Phases 2 and 3 if a decision is made to go forward with the programme. This plan should be
continually updated as the project goes forward.
(4) Based on the outputs of 2 and 3 above, identify the requirements for NPP personnel selection, recruitment,
training and authorization for which assistance is to be sought from the vendor (to be developed during
Phase 2 as an input to the bid invitation specification).
A project approach should be taken to develop the above outputs driven by a suitable project manager. When
a NEPIO has been established, one of the members of the NEPIO should be assigned for managing/coordinating
human resources development activities.
The initial workforce plan may be efficiently developed in the following manner:
—Start with a self-evaluation of infrastructure status [4];
—Identify gaps for all 19 issues, phase by phase, based on organizational responsibilities and activities;
—Identify underlying causes, including lack of competent personnel;
—Define solutions, including human resources related solutions in terms of numbers of people needed,
organizations, competencies;
—Implement solutions;
—Evaluate effectiveness of actions/solutions.
32
9. OVERVIEW OF CASE STUDIES
Finally, a number of case studies have been developed to highlight the real experience of different Member
States as related to different phases of infrastructure building. Appendix V addresses the early development of the
Chinese nuclear energy programme, which was based on a very specific partnering at the national level with
France. The example from the Republic of Korea, detailed in Appendix VI, illustrated a more broad based
approach, where early experience was taken from a number of nuclear experienced countries. Appendix VII looks
at nuclear workforce development from an Indian perspective.
At the time of writing, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) had just agreed on a contract, consistent with
completion of Phase 2, with a consortium from the Republic of Korea to build and operate their first NPP, and their
approach to human resources development is summarized in Appendix VIII.
The IAEA is supporting Armenia in an evaluation of its human resources needs in conjunction with a new
build as part of a broader study of the feasibility of new builds. Armenia’s case is unusual in that, although it
currently operates an NPP, that plant was built during the era of the Soviet Union, and it does not currently have
much of the infrastructure required for a new build. A summary of the evaluation of human resources development
needs is included in Appendix IX. Finally, details of a software modelling tool that may be of help in developing
workforce planning strategies are included in Appendix X.
33
Appendix I
AN EXAMPLE OF NPP STAFFING NUMBERS BY FUNCTION
This appendix provides median staffing levels (current at the time of writing) from 67 operating North
American and western European nuclear power plants. They include several different one and two unit nuclear
reactor designs. Some of the plants achieved commercial operations in the 1960s, and some came on-line as late as
the 1990s. Some of the plants are in a ‘fleet’ where one operating organization runs more than one nuclear site,
while others are the only NPP operated by a particular utility or operating company.
The data does not reflect significantly different approaches to staffing levels that are driven by regulatory,
cultural and operating organization preferences/requirements. This means that the median value shown may be
significantly different from the minimum or maximum level at a particular NPP. The history of staffing approaches
varies across a significant spectrum. Some NPPs had significantly lower staffing levels at startup that grew over
time with operational experience and regulatory development. Other NPPs began commercial operations with very
high levels because they retained many of the architect/engineering/construction staff after startup and then slowly
reduced staff over long periods of time. The reader is reminded that the data in this appendix represents only about
15% of the 435 NPP units that were in operation at the time of writing. Consequently, the data shown in the
referenced table does not address many of the variables that affect staffing levels in other regions or for other
technologies than those represented in this sample. Thus, the staffing data shown should only be used as a general
guide for new organizations contemplating deployment of a new NPP, and not for developing specific target
staffing levels. The numbers shown represent the staffing numbers of mature nuclear operating organizations and
should not be considered as near term targets for first NPPs, which may be higher.
For further information, see IAEA-TECDOC-1052, Nuclear Power Plant Organization and Staffing for
Improved Performance: Lessons Learned (1998). This publication provides examples of staffing levels and factors
that affected these staffing levels. Even though this data is over 10 years old, much of it continues to be relevant.
34
Nuclear plant staffing
1-unit 2-unit
Nuclear work function Median Median
Admin/clerical 25 42
ALARA 4 4
Budget/accting 7 9
Chemistry 17 26
Communications 2 2
Computer engineering 3 4
Contracts 1 3
Decon/radwaste 11 12
Design/drafting 5 7
Document control/records 11 12
Emergency preparedness 5 5
Environmental 3 3
Facilities 21 27
Fire protection 1 2
HP applied 17 28
HP support 8 10
Human resources 4 4
Information management 13 14
Licensing 7 9
Maintenance/construction 119 186
Maintenance/construction support 22 39
Management 30 35
Management support 2 2
Materials management 3 4
Mods engineering 22 33
Nuclear fuels 4 7
Nuclear safety review 6 6
Operations 74 122
Operations support 20 20
Outage management 5 7
Plant engineering 33 47
Procurement engineering 5 6
Project management 7 11
Purchasing 4 7
QA 8 11
QC/NDE 7 7
Reactor engineering 4 5
Safety/health 2 3
Scheduling 11 15
Security 119 128
Technical engineering 19 31
Training 32 43
Warehouse 9 14
Total 732 1012
35
Appendix II
WORK FUNCTION DEFINITIONS
This appendix provides a brief definition of each of the 43 work functions for the 67 NPP units from North
America and Western Europe that were the basis for the data in Appendix II. This information is provided to help
the reader understand this data or to compare a given situation or plan to these functions. It is NOT intended to
endorse this particular identification of workforce functions, as there is considerable variability in NPP workforce
functions and organization worldwide based upon factors such as technology, national norms and culture, labour
rules and laws, and industry practices.
II.1. ADMINISTRATION/CLERICAL
Includes all secretaries, clerks and clerical pools. It also includes administrative assistants who provide
administrative support in a function but who themselves are not functional professionals. Also included are staff
performing administrative support functions such as conference coordination, graphics work and non-technical
analysis of data. Supervisors of clerical pools are included in the function, as are telephone receptionists. This group
also includes persons maintaining site-wide procedures.
II.2. ALARA/RADIOLOGICAL ENGINEERING
Includes persons planning and controlling the as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) programme, and
performing and evaluating radiation dose and shielding calculations. It also includes staff reviewing complex
radiation work permits.
II.3. BUDGETING/ACCOUNTING
Responsible for operation of budget and accounting systems under nuclear group control. Disseminates
accounting and budget information and organizes budget input. Oversees preparation of budgets and provides
ongoing accountability reports to managers. Prepares nuclear group business plans and interfaces with joint owners.
II.4. CHEMISTRY
Includes chemistry technicians for normal and emergency shift functions such as chemical additions and
chemical/radiochemical analyses. Also includes persons coordinating all aspects of the chemistry programme and
providing guidance on chemistry standards; conducting evaluations of plant chemistry programmes; and addressing
and resolving chemistry operating problems. Also includes staff responsible for radioactive effluents programme.
II.5. COMMUNICATIONS
Media representatives, internal communications and tour guide staff are included in this function. Also
included are those persons serving as community contacts, answering local questions, organizing publicity projects
and operating or providing tours at plant visitor/information centres.
36
II.6. COMPUTER ENGINEERING
Responsible for hardware and software engineering associated with plant process computers, radiation
monitoring system and other operational and support computers and systems. Includes personnel who provided
similar services for the training simulators.
II.7. CONTRACTS
Coordinates placing of bids, and awarding and monitoring of performance on contracts for labour and
services. Controls contract changes and associated claims. Coordinates administration and enforcement of contract
terms and conditions such as bonus/penalty clauses and cost-plus provisions.
II.8. DECONTAMINATION/RADWASTE PROCESSING
Includes all persons performing decontamination and cleanup inside the power block, and those responsible
for dry radwaste systems, and for packaging and transport of contaminated materials.
II.9. DESIGN/DRAFTING
Performs manual and computer aided design and engineering functions. Resolves field questions, and
maintains piping and instrument diagrams and electric power line diagrams. Prepares stress isometrics. Can
perform simple calculations.
II.10. DOCUMENT CONTROL/RECORDS
Receives, prepares, microfilms and indexes nuclear records and drawings. Controls and distributes station
documents. Coordinates other aspects of document processing, records management, and central files and libraries.
Clerical personnel performing records duties are included in this category, not with clerks.
II.11. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Develops, implements and maintains the emergency preparedness programme. Trains and qualifies
emergency exercise participants. Responsible for emergency preparedness facilities, including the emergency
operations facility (EOF) and tactical support centre (TSC). Focal point for local, state and federal legislation on
emergency preparedness issues.
II.12. ENVIRONMENTAL
Includes persons responsible for the non-radiological environmental monitoring programme and related
requirements such as environmental licences and permits, audits and thermal monitoring.
II.13. FACILITIES
Includes persons directing and performing routine preventive maintenance, corrective maintenance and
predictive maintenance activities on non-power block buildings, systems and components other than substations.
Also includes persons responsible for general yard work, telephone systems and vehicle maintenance.
37
II.14. FIRE PROTECTION
Administers the fire protection programme, including surveillance. Responsible for fire protection
programme inspections. Includes personnel who serve on full-time fire brigades.
II.15. HEALTH PHYSICS APPLIED
Includes radiation protection technicians involved with activities such as routine and special surveys, and data
reading and analysis. Also includes persons collecting and analysing radiation system samples.
II.16. HEALTH PHYSICS SUPPORT
Personnel responsible for technical oversight of health physics programme. Includes persons involved with
respiratory protection, radiological environmental and dosimetry programmes, including clerical staff maintaining
dosimetry records.
II.17. HUMAN RESOURCES
Responsible for implementation and operation of human resources, and personnel programmes and systems
such as appraisal, benefits, compensation, vacancy selection and promotion. Coordinates employment and equal
employment opportunity activities, as well as management development training. Typically includes the central
point of contact for union relations.
II.18. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
Responsible for dedicated software and hardware support for business and management application and
database management for nuclear group systems. Provides software related system design, revision and user
information services. Provides operations and system administration resources for hosts and servers. Also provides
system hardware design, revision and user information services. Responds to technical and information requests
from internal and external sources.
II.19. LICENSING/REGULATORY AFFAIRS
Primary contact for licensing and other regulatory issues with national regulatory body (regulatory body).
Coordinates and reviews responses to regulatory body routine and special information requests, including licensee
event reports (LERs), notices of violation and generic letters. Coordinates annual FSAR update process.
II.20. MAINTENANCE/CONSTRUCTION
Includes persons whose primary function is to perform maintenance and construction work within the power
block. This includes routine preventive maintenance, corrective maintenance and predictive maintenance activities
on plant components. It also includes the installation of minor and major modifications and metrology work.
Persons who directly supervise these activities are also included in the function. Includes mechanical, I&C and
electrical maintenance staff and their supervisors.
38
II.21. MAINTENANCE/CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT
This function includes people who support the work of maintenance/construction. This includes those
involved in job package development, and assembling, completing and reviewing documentation associated with
the maintenance effort; non-engineering degreed maintenance technical experts; non-engineering degreed persons
developing maintenance strategies and resolving maintenance rule issues; personnel coordinating with plant
engineers on the development of corrective maintenance procedures and other technical matters; and full-time
maintenance procedure writers. Also included in this group are personnel who support plant modification work
such as coordination of contractor labour, and cost and schedule estimating. Tool room attendants are included in
this function. The function does not include schedulers, designers or plant engineers.
II.22. MANAGEMENT
Includes all management personnel above first line supervisors in each organization up to and including the
company’s chief nuclear officer.
II.23. MANAGEMENT ASSIST
Includes personnel assigned to multifunctional special projects supporting managers. Includes persons
supporting organizational or plant wide projects.
II.24. MATERIALS MANAGEMENT
Includes persons responsible for inventory control, disposal of surplus materials, and management and
operation of inventory re-order point programmes. Also includes responsibilities for assigning stock numbers,
consolidating stores inventory and maintaining ordering information.
II.25. MODIFICATIONS ENGINEERING
Provides modification engineering services and ensures design integrity for:
—Civil/structural engineering, including site buildings, roads, bridges and waterfront structure. Performs soil
and foundations analyses, and reviews and approves hanger and support locations. Provides stress analysis
and support evaluation services. Provides architectural and site layout services.
—Electrical/I&C engineering, including high, medium and low voltage distribution systems (including DC and
instrument power), related components (including motors, circuit breakers, transformers, batteries, chargers
and inverters) and instrumentation and control systems and components.
—Mechanical engineering, including primary, secondary and auxiliary systems, and associated components,
including piping, insulation and hangers.
II.26. NUCLEAR FUELS
Performs and/or reviews reload safety evaluation, reload design analyses, and thermal, hydraulic and transient
analyses. Provides support to operations for core analysis. Supports fuel licensing and fuel management activities.
Includes personnel who manage and monitor the nuclear fuel acquisition process.
39
II.27. NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW
Responsible for off-site and on-site safety review activities. Reviews operating abnormalities and advises
management on overall quality and safety of operations. Reviews operational and regulatory related documents
such as LERs, and license and technical specification changes. Reviews plant and industry event reports for
applicability and lessons learned. Performs coordination function for INPO contacts. Includes Independent Safety
Engineering Group (ISEG) activities and dedicated corrective action programme personnel. Also includes human
performance programme activities and the employee concerns programme.
II.28. OPERATIONS
Includes on-shift staff, supervisors and shift managers responsible for operating primary, secondary and liquid
radwaste systems; if performed by shift staff, includes preparing or reviewing responses to operating events and
associated inquiries from other organizations.
II.29. OPERATIONS SUPPORT
This function includes non-shift personnel supporting the operations staff, including dedicated procedure
writers, scheduling coordinators, technical specialists and training coordinators. Also included are persons in
licensed operator training classes.
II.30. OUTAGE MANAGEMENT
Includes persons planning and coordinating all outage activities. Central contact point for refueling and
maintenance outage planning and management, and forced outage management. Includes dedicated outage work
window managers.
II.31. PLANT ENGINEERING
Includes persons evaluating system and component performance, and monitoring system operating
performance parameters (system health). These persons provide engineering assistance to maintenance in the
development of corrective maintenance actions; develop and review procedures and technical reports/responses;
and review surveillance, modifications and system related studies generated internally and externally. Responsible
for coordination and review of post-maintenance and post-modification testing and surveillance testing
programmes, and for conducting and reviewing the local leak rate test (LLRT) and integrated leak rate test (ILRT)
programmes. Serves as site point of contact for technical and procedural system and component testing issues. Also
includes component and field engineers.
II.32. PROCUREMENT ENGINEERING
Responsible for materials qualification process, including parts substitution. Identifies and resolves supplier
non-conformance. Manages and performs commercial parts dedication testing and supports like-for-like
replacement analyses.
40
II.33. PROJECT MANAGEMENT
Directs, controls and monitors contractor and in-house design packages and other work in support of
engineering functions. Reviews products to ensure high quality work. Participates in developing bid packages.
Establishes and monitors milestone schedules for assigned work. Assists in reviewing contractor proposals and
recommending contract awards. Coordinates resolution of technical questions directed to or originated by
contractors.
II.34. PURCHASING
Includes buyers, expediters and other procurement personnel responsible for obtaining contracted materials
and services by evaluating and processing purchase requisitions and proposals. Persons are responsible for
managing the return of damaged goods and are primary vendor liaisons.
II.35. QUALITY ASSURANCE (QA)
Ensures the implementation of the approved QA programme through periodic audits and surveillances.
Provides follow-up in areas of concern from audits. Analyses the status and adequacy of operational
QA programme and established QA policy for management approval. Develops and maintains required QA
procedures and manuals. Includes persons who operate the vendor audit programme. Supports and reviews
organizational self-assessments.
II.36. QUALITY CONTROL/NON-DESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION (NDE)
Implements inspection hold point programme and performs associated inspections of ongoing activities.
Reviews work activities to ensure compliance with QA programme requirements. Performs receipt inspections for
QA programme materials. Includes personnel who perform non-destructive examinations, including
radiography/sonography of welds and fittings.
II.37. REACTOR ENGINEERING
Includes personnel analysing fuel performance, performing core performance monitoring and trending, and
providing support and technical direction to operations during refueling, startup and shutdown.
II.38. SAFETY/HEALTH
Focal point for Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirements and contacts. Manages
and maintains the industrial safety programme. Also includes personnel responsible for medical exams and
emergency medical assistance.
II.39. SCHEDULING
Includes persons who schedule non-refuelling outage work activities for operations, maintenance and
surveillance activities. Also includes persons coordinating with maintenance, construction management and
engineering for daily schedule review and update. Persons preparing system outages and forced outage schedules
are included with this function. Includes work week managers.
41
II.40. SECURITY
Provides physical site security. Responsible for development of security plans and procedures. Addresses
technical issues pertaining to security regulations and requirements. Also includes staff responsible for site access
control and fitness for duty programmes.
II.41. TECHNICAL ENGINEERING
Researches and analyses technical engineering issues but does not perform modification design package
development. Provides support to modification engineers and plant/system engineers. Dispositions, nonconformances
and other assigned items. Responds to design basis and configuration control issues and questions.
Serves as technical consultant on engineering issues. Responds to technical inquiries and information requests from
internal and external sources. Responsible for engineering services and key programmes in specialized technical
areas not included in other engineering functions, such as equipment qualification, configuration management,
in-service inspection, fire protection engineering and probabilistic risk assessment. Ensures design integrity for
assigned specialized areas.
II.42. TRAINING
Provides or coordinates all formal training for nuclear staff including all INPO accredited programmes.
Coordinates training schedules and produces training reports. Provides instructor training and development as well
as instructional system design and implementation. Operates plant simulators.
II.43. WAREHOUSE
Includes all persons directly associated with physical inventories, including persons performing materials
inspection, tracking and maintenance. May deliver materials from warehouse or other storage locations to staging
points in support of maintenance/construction or modification activities.
42
Appendix III
AN EXAMPLE OF QUALIFICATION AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
BY WORK FUNCTION
The information in Table III.1 is provided to further assist the reader in understanding the information
provided in Appendices II and III regarding staffing levels and functions for a sample of some 67 NPP units. This
information is based upon the education, experience and training requirements/practices in the United States of
America (USA). The reader is cautioned that there is considerable variability in these requirements/practices in
other countries that currently have operating NPPs. For example, in the USA there is NO requirement for NPP
control room operators to have a bachelor’s degree in science or engineering, whereas in some of the 29 other
countries that have operating NPPs, there is. The table also shows the reliance upon national standards/norms (such
as ANSI 3.1).
43
TABLE III.1. QUALIFICATION AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS BY WORK FUNCTION
Nuclear work function Competencies/Experience requirements Educational requirements Training requirements Lead time required
Admin/Clerical Basic computer software competence
(word processing, presentations, etc.)
Secondary/High school diploma or
equivalent
NPP general employee training (GET) N/A
ALARA/Radiological
engineering
Basic computer competence; experience
at commercial NPPs; health physics
experience
Bachelor’s degree in sciences, health
physics or related discipline
NPP general employee training (GET) 5 years
Budget/Accounting Basic computer competence; financial
and analytical capabilities
Bachelor’s degree in business, finance,
accounting, or related field
Government and/or NPP owner
requirements for accounts reporting
systems
N/A
Chemistry 3 years work experience in chemistry field Secondary/High school diploma or
equivalent, university level chemistry
and mathematics
Certification such as ANSI 3.1 1978
chemistry, NPP plant specific systems
training
3 months
Communications Excellent written and verbal
communication competence;
knowledge of local language and
grammar, human relations, internet
technology and industry trends
Bachelor’s degree in journalism,
public relations or related field
N/A N/A
Computer engineering Basic computer competence; NPP
experience; technical understanding
of nuclear plant process computer
and full scope simulator
Bachelor’s degree in engineering or
a related technical field
Plant technical training 2 years
Contracts Basic computer competence;
knowledge of contracting concepts;
good communications competence;
financial analysis skills; negotiation skills
Bachelor’s degree Government and/or NPP owner
requirements for contracting and
contracts reporting systems
1 year
Decontamination/Radwaste
processing
2 years of radwaste process experience Secondary/High school diploma or
equivalent
Radwaste worker course, waste
treatment and radwaste operators
course
1 month
Design/Drafting Basic computer competence; experience
with reading and interpreting schematic
drawings
Secondary/High school diploma or
equivalent; some requirements for
bachelor’s degree in a technical field
Plant technical training; computer
aided design (CAD) systems training
1 year
Document control/Records Basic computer competence;
understanding of document control and
records management
Secondary/High school diploma or
equivalent
Government and/or NPP owner
requirements for document
control/records management systems
3 months
44
Emergency preparedness Experience in operations and/or radiation
protection
Bachelor’s degree or professional
certification
NPP general employee training (GET);
operations certification required in
some cases
5 years
Environmental Experience in environmental science,
sample collection and reporting
requirements
Bachelor’s degree or professional
certification
Government and/or NPP owner
requirements for environmental safety
and reporting requirements
6 months
Facilities Physical fitness; basic mechanical
competence
N/A NPP general employee training (GET) N/A
Fire protection Knowledge of fire protection engineering
principles, including fire hazard analysis,
fire protection technology, fire system
design, codes and regulations
Bachelor’s degree in engineering
technology or a similar discipline
NPP general employee training (GET) 1 year
Health physics applied Physical fitness requirements;
understanding of physical sciences
Secondary/High school diploma or
equivalent
Rad worker training 1 month
Health physics support Understanding of physical sciences Secondary/High school diploma or
equivalent
Rad worker training 1 month
Human resources Basic computer competence; experience
with retirement plans, and health and
welfare benefits; must be familiar with
national labour laws
Bachelor’s degree in human resources,
business, mathematics or finance
NPP general employee training (GET) N/A
Information management Advanced computer competence;
experience with computer hardware and
software systems, including database
administration, cyber security and network
administration
Bachelor’s degree in computer science,
information management or related field
NPP general employee training (GET) 3 months
Licensing/Regulatory
affairs
2+ of years of experience in nuclear
industry, basic computer competence,
nuclear engineering
Bachelor’s degree in a technical field NPP general employee training (GET) 6 months
TABLE III.1. QUALIFICATION AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS BY WORK FUNCTION (cont.)
Nuclear work function Competencies/Experience requirements Educational requirements Training requirements Lead time required
45
Maintenance/Construction Physical fitness; basic mechanical
competence; good communication
competence
Secondary/High school diploma or
equivalent
Apprentice, journeyman, master level
discipline skill level training required
(mechanical, electrical, I&C);
certification training for non-discipline
craft such as crane and rigging
operators, fork lift operators,
scaffolding and insulation, etc.
Varies (for discipline craft):
some national governments
require a 3 year apprentice
training programme prior to
initial work at the nuclear
plant; others allow OJT
provided by the plant owner
with initial training times as
short as 6 weeks prior to OJT
Maintenance/Construction
support
Planner: experience in NPP operation and
basic computer competence;
Other support roles: experience in basic
plant operations and industrial safety
Secondary/High school diploma or
equivalent
OJT within specific area, i.e.
scaffolding assembly and disassembly,
insulation removal and replacement,
work package plan development, etc.
Planner: 5 years;
Other support roles:
1–3 months
Management Understanding of design and operation
of power plant systems
Bachelor’s degree normally required Supervisory, management and/or
leadership training, typically provided
by the NPP owner
Years, when considering
hiring a new employee and
developing that employee
into a position of
responsibility at least one
level above first line
supervisor
Management assist Varies by the role as defined the by
NPP owner; may include basic computer
competence, good communication
competence, project management
experience, etc
Secondary/High school diploma or
equivalent; some positions require a
bachelor’s degree
NPP general employee training (GET);
some will require operations training or
engineering technical training
Varies, but typically less
than 1 year
Materials management Experience with inventory management
approaches and systems
Secondary/High school diploma or
equivalent
NPP owner provided training for the
NPP’s/owners’ supply chain inventory
management systems
1 month
Modification engineering Understanding of design and operation
of power plant systems and knowledge
of applicable codes, standards and
environmental regulations; experience
with project management often required
Bachelor’s degree in mechanical electrical
or civil engineering
Plant technical training, professional
engineer license often required
3–5 years
TABLE III.1. QUALIFICATION AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS BY WORK FUNCTION (cont.)
Nuclear work function Competencies/Experience requirements Educational requirements Training requirements Lead time required
46
Nuclear fuels Engineering economics or other formal
financial experience; nuclear fuel cycle
and financial analysis experience
Bachelor’s degree in engineering, business
administration or a related field
Plant technical training 5 years
Nuclear safety review Experience with root cause analyses,
human performance evaluations,
collection and analysis of industry
operating event reports
Secondary/High school diploma or
equivalent; some positions require a
bachelor’s degree
Plant technical training 5 years
Operations Basic mechanical and computer
competencies
Generally required: a secondary/high
school diploma or equivalent; some
governments and/or nuclear plant owners
require a bachelor’s degree
Plant equipment and nuclear plant
control room operations training,
typically provided by either a
government agency or the nuclear
plant owner
2–5 years depending
on job position
Operations support Basic mechanical and computer
competencies; NPP experience.
Bachelor’s degree in engineering or other
technical discipline; or 2 year
college/technical degree with additional
direct job experience; or secondary/high
school diploma or equivalent with several
more years of additional direct job
experience in nuclear plant operations
Initial operator training or reactor
operator training or senior reactor
operator training
6–10 years depending on
educational background
Outage management Basic computer competence; NPP
experience; technical understanding
of nuclear generation principles and
operations
Bachelor’s degree in engineering or other
technical discipline
NPP owner provided training in plant
scheduling systems
5 years
Plant engineering Basic computer competence; NPP
experience; technical understanding
of nuclear generation principles and
operations
Bachelor’s degree in engineering or a
related technical field
Plant technical training 2 years
Procurement engineering Basic computer competence; NPP
experience; technical understanding
of nuclear plant equipment and design
Bachelor’s degree in engineering or a
related technical field
Plant technical training 2 years
Project management Basic computer competence; project
management competence; good
communications and negotiation
competencies; data analysis competence
Bachelor’s degree in a technical or
management related field
Basic project management training
course
3 years
TABLE III.1. QUALIFICATION AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS BY WORK FUNCTION (cont.)
Nuclear work function Competencies/Experience requirements Educational requirements Training requirements Lead time required
47
Purchasing Basic computer competence; knowledge
of category and supply management
concepts; good communications; data
analysis and negotiation competencies
Bachelor’s degree in engineering, business
administration or a related field
Government and/or NPP owner
requirements for procurement and
procurement reporting systems
3–5 years
Quality assurance Experience in NPP design, operations,
maintenance or other nuclear related
activities; experience in quality assurance
programmes and concepts; senior reactor
operator licence or certification preferred
for operations area; design or system
engineering experience preferred for
engineering area; maintenance or work
control experience preferred for the
maintenance area
Bachelor’s degree in a technical field Government and/or NPP owner
requirements for quality assurance
reporting systems
6 years
Quality control/
Non-destructive
examination
Physical fitness; basic computer
competence; general knowledge of QC and
NDE inspection and examination
techniques
Secondary/High school diploma or
equivalent
ANSI qualification training
programme: combination of classroom
training and field work
Varies by level of
certification: up to 8 years for
a Level IV certified inspector
Reactor engineering Basic understanding of physical sciences;
advanced computer competence;
understanding of nuclear and reactor
physics
Bachelor’s degree in engineering Nuclear plant reactor-specific training
(PWR, BWR, CANDU, AGR, VVER,
etc.)
2 years
Safety/Health Ability to interpret, implement and
communicate occupational health codes
and standards; demonstrated skills in the
application of personal protective
equipment, industrial hygiene monitoring
and sampling, risk assessment and
mitigation of workplace safety, health and
environmental issues
Bachelor’s degree in environmental
science, engineering, industrial hygiene,
public health or other physical science
Industrial safety training programme;
first aid/first responder training
6 months
Scheduling General power plant experience in
maintenance, operations or engineering,
including plant system knowledge; good
communications competence
Bachelor’s degree in a technical field NPP owner provided training in plant
scheduling systems
8 years of nuclear plant
experience in maintenance,
operations or engineering
TABLE III.1. QUALIFICATION AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS BY WORK FUNCTION (cont.)
Nuclear work function Competencies/Experience requirements Educational requirements Training requirements Lead time required
48
Security Physical fitness and/or agility
requirements; psychological testing/fitness
may be required
Secondary/High school diploma or
equivalent
Basic plant operations principles;
fire arms training may be required
3–6 months
Technical engineering Basic computer competence; nuclear
power plant experience; technical
understanding of nuclear generation
principles and operations
Bachelor’s degree in engineering or a
related technical field
Plant technical training 2 years
Training Detailed knowledge of plant procedures
and regulations in assigned area; detailed
knowledge of plant systems and processes;
working knowledge of computer software
programs supporting assigned area
Secondary/High school diploma or
equivalent; senior reactor operator
certification for operations training; master
level competency in required discipline
(mechanical, electrical, or instrumentation
and controls) for maintenance training;
bachelor’s degree in an engineering field
for engineering/technical training
Instructional training 5 years, due to on the job
experience requirements
Warehouse Physical fitness; heavy lifting safety Secondary/High school diploma or
equivalent
Industrial safety training; fork lift
operations
1 month
TABLE III.1. QUALIFICATION AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS BY WORK FUNCTION (cont.)
Nuclear work function Competencies/Experience requirements Educational requirements Training requirements Lead time required
49
Appendix IV
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT
Knowledge management is an evolving subject area based on two notions:
—That knowledge is a fundamental aspect of effective organizational performance;
—That specific steps need to be actively taken to promote knowledge creation and use.
Two common approaches to knowledge management that are often used in combination include:
—Knowledge management focused on the capture of explicit knowledge and sharing this via technology;
—Knowledge management focused on managing tacit knowledge without necessarily making it explicit, and
creating new knowledge as well as sharing existing knowledge.
In the context of human resources development, knowledge management is strongly tied to strategy and is
activity oriented. Properly applied knowledge management improves organizational efficiency and productivity
through reducing process times, introducing technology to assist finding relevant information and instituting
techniques to remedy poor quality outputs. Knowledge management also promotes innovations, which can result
from initiatives such as developing social networks for knowledge exchange, providing leadership to encourage
risk taking and capturing the lessons learned from past activities. Both of these benefits require openness to change
and a drive for continual improvement.
Other benefits of knowledge management include improved decision making, retaining organizational
memory and organizational learning, as well as improving morale. Knowledge management can be used on its own
or in collaboration with other management disciplines and tools to establish an environment that will enable the
organization to realize these benefits.
Summarizing the effective management of nuclear knowledge includes ensuring the continued availability of
qualified personnel. As the nuclear workforce ages and retires, and with support uncertain for university
programmes in nuclear science and engineering, this issue has become critical to ensuring safety and security,
encouraging innovation and making certain that the benefits of nuclear energy related to different applications
including electricity supply remain available for future generations.
IV.1. THE PHASES OF KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT
The scope of knowledge management can be at different levels — applied to a whole organization or more
broadly, or simply to a small office or work group, depending on organizational needs or resources. Examples of
knowledge management applications include developing an organization wide knowledge strategy linked to human
resource development, incorporating knowledge management into existing projects and processes (e.g. NPP
personnel training) and implementing projects with a specific knowledge goal.
For different knowledge management applications or initiatives, three phases of implementation can be
identified:
—Understanding the context for knowledge management and establishing a special purpose for the initiative,
which may include promoting knowledge sharing, improving the management of explicit knowledge,
fostering innovation and knowledge creation, and developing a knowledge management strategic plan for the
organization. The aim of this phase is to develop an understanding of the internal and external environment of
the organization through examining strategy, organizational capability and culture, as well as drivers.
—Examining knowledge gaps. This phase encourages more investigation of the desired knowledge
environment. This desired situation should reflect the organizational strategy and the context of the
organization, and give a vision of the knowledge environment as it could be. A useful framework for analysis
of the knowledge environment comprises four knowledge elements — people, process, technology and
content. The analysis of knowledge gaps may have revealed a number of gaps or weaknesses. Examples may
50
include barriers to knowledge sharing, problems with management of explicit knowledge and lack of
awareness of tacit knowledge.
—Facilitating knowledge in action. The aim of this phase is to select and implement approaches, methods and
tools to address the identified knowledge gaps. Examples of knowledge management techniques related to
human resources development in nuclear organizations can be found in IAEA-TECDOC-1510, Knowledge
Management for Nuclear Industry Operating Organizations (2006). Knowledge management does not end
with the implementation of an initiative. It is necessary to review and monitor the initiative, the environment
and organizational strategy, and to continue working towards further improvement and alignment.
Effective knowledge management should become part of the initiative itself. Explicit and tacit knowledge
developed during the course of the initiative should be captured, managed and shared.
IV.2. SOME KEY CONSIDERATIONS
IV.2.1. Explicit and tacit knowledge
Explicit knowledge is easier to manage through capturing all important information in electronic form or hard
copy, to create manuals, databases, project design documents, maintenance manuals, project variation orders and so
on. Identification of documentation requirements and associated procedures for the creation, maintenance and
updating of documents needs to be addressed, however, also as an upfront project requirement during the design
phase and should not be added on later as an afterthought.
Tacit knowledge primarily makes up the core competence within an organization and is more difficult to
preserve and transfer to successors. Where the transfer of tacit knowledge has not been incorporated into the
organizational learning process, an organizational memory loss occurs when key persons leave, which has often
been the main reason for a project’s failure. Organizational memory shapes an organization’s culture, management
approach, decision making process, communication strategies and lastly the definition of its operating boundaries
captured in its job descriptions. Tacit knowledge, by its very nature, is an elusive concept and cannot be captured
easily by conventional means. Standards and codes are also made by national bureaus of standards of various
countries as well as professional societies, and these also help in knowledge preservation. The nuclear industry has
to submit detailed documentation for clearance to national regulatory bodies, and this requirement has helped in
documenting nuclear and radiation safety information in detail.
The real challenge facing knowledge management is the capture of this vital component of organizational
continuity, particularly within rapidly changing organizations undergoing the turmoil of downsizing or
reengineering processes. New techniques and tools for knowledge preservation such as learning audits and the
establishment of oral histories have now been added to the traditional technique of exit interviews.
Tools to facilitate the capture of tacit knowledge have been developed and are being continuously improved.
The experience in building these tools and the lessons learned through their use include the following key insights:
Planning for knowledge management, implementing and evaluating
Organizations should develop a knowledge management strategy, provide organizational structure for its
implementation, allocate an adequate budget for the planned activities, provide incentives to the staff to implement
and improve the process, and at the end of each activity, evaluate the performance compared with the expected
results to enable feedback for continuous improvement of the process.
Fostering a knowledge sharing culture
In a knowledge based economy, knowledge sharing is not merely an alternative strategic option, it is required
for organizational survival. Measures for the aggregation and sharing of knowledge should be initiated, and a more
open, knowledge sharing culture should be fostered within the organization. Capturing what is already known by
someone else in the group and adding one’s own knowledge is faster and more efficient than reinventing a solution.
51
The sharing of knowledge has particular relevance to the nuclear energy sector, where actions taken now may have
consequences for the planet for tens of thousands of years.
Starting and implementing knowledge sharing in an organization must be done from inside the organization,
not grafted from outside. Experience indicates that most successful knowledge sharing programmes are driven by
insiders. The insiders must own the process, be involved in all aspects of it, make the changes happen and
encourage others to make the changes. At the same time, the insiders must use the outside world to validate and
push the agenda forward within the organization. For example, using the external recognition and knowledge fairs
and expos as ways of showing that what is happening internally is valid and useful in adding value.
Establishing communities of practice
The phenomenon of communities of practice is known under different names such as thematic groups,
learning communities, learning networks, best practice teams and so on. It is essentially the formation of
professional groups facilitating staff to come together voluntarily to share similar interests and learn from one
another. Knowledge sharing on a significant scale is observed to be taking place only in organizations that have
organized themselves into communities of practice. These communities need to be integrated into the company’s
strategy and its organizational structure. Communities, however, are a non-hierarchical phenomenon, and
management hierarchies have generally had considerable difficulty in learning how to nurture them. Modern
organizations have been built on a rational and mechanistic approach to problem solving. However, experience
shows that communities of practice only flourish when their members are passionately committed to a common
purpose. This is a hard lesson for companies and executives who have spent their lives trying to keep emotion out
of the work place.
Upgrading information management
Successful knowledge organizations have learned that building web sites and offering knowledge
management IT tools neither create nor transfer knowledge by themselves. Employees stop visiting these web sites
or using these IT tools if a community of practice is not bringing credibility and contributing content to these
instruments. IT tools are made to facilitate knowledge sharing among users rather than constraining the emergence
of a sharing culture by imposing complex technical requirements. An important insight is that building a learning
organization requires building communities within which that learning can take place. Without communities linked
to structure, organizations do not learn very fast at all.
IV.2.2. Risk management of knowledge loss
Developing and maintaining nuclear competencies in the nuclear industry and nuclear regulatory authorities
will be one of the most critical challenges in the near future for countries with existing nuclear power programmes,
as well as for countries considering the introduction of nuclear power. The loss of employees with critical nuclear
knowledge and corporate memory poses a clear internal threat to the continued development or operation of nuclear
power facilities. In addition, the loss of this knowledge and expertise could impact future plans for the construction
of new, advanced designed nuclear units.
The IAEA has developed practical guidance on knowledge loss risk management (see the Bibliography). The
guidance is based upon actual experiences of IAEA Member State operating organizations and is intended to
increase awareness of the need to develop an integrated and strategic approach to capture critical knowledge before
it is lost. Specific objectives of such guidance are to enable nuclear organizations to:
—Conduct knowledge loss risk assessments to identify specific knowledge loss threats;
—Evaluate the consequences of the loss of critical knowledge and skills;
—Develop action plans to retain this knowledge;
—Utilize this knowledge to improve the skill and competence of new and existing workers.
It is important that tools and processes of knowledge loss risk management methodology are not stand-alone
initiatives but are a part of an overall knowledge management system.
52
IV.2.3. Nuclear safety and nuclear knowledge
One of the most crucial roles of knowledge management lies in the field of nuclear safety, since lapses in
safety, due to loss of knowledge, would have severe consequences for the industry. Implementing effective
knowledge management systems in the field of nuclear safety is beneficial not only for the safety of plant personnel
and the general public but also for improving the public’s perception of the nuclear industry and enhancing the
commercial performance of plants. With fully trained, highly skilled and well equipped operational staff, nuclear
safety can be maintained without much difficulty. Plants that are run safely also operate efficiently and reliably;
production is maximized, which should ultimately have a positive effect on company balance sheets.
A wide variety of activities were initiated by the IAEA related to knowledge management and networking in
the area of nuclear safety, and a holistic approach has been adopted to enhance the effectiveness of programme
delivery. Innovative approaches are being utilized to capture, create and share safety knowledge and to assist
Member States in their efforts to develop and to maintain sustainable education and training programmes. A major
nuclear safety challenge is to foster a global knowledge sharing culture to achieve the motto that ‘a safety
improvement anywhere is an improvement of safety everywhere’. The measures being implemented include
mapping and retrieving safety knowledge, developing of process flows and facilitating the development of regional
safety networks such as the Asian Nuclear Safety Network.
53
Appendix V
CASE STUDY OF DAYA BAY:
A POSITIVE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY BETWEEN FRANCE AND CHINA
V.1. INTRODUCTION
This appendix presents the workforce and education plan established between France and China for the
construction of two nuclear reactors in Daya Bay in the 1980s. This cooperation was planned in the initial contract,
and therefore mainly concerned the training of key Chinese staff for the operation of the units. Hence, this study
aims to describe practically some key elements related to Phase 3 of the Milestones publication (i.e. after
Milestone 2, when a commercial contract has been signed) from the France–China experience.
Some more general facts and figures are included for the workforce and training planning related to the two
first phases of the Milestones publication, based on the French experience. They must be adapted for a specific
country’s context on a case by case basis.
The case presented hereafter is to be considered strictly as an example within its own context and not as a
reference case for future projects.
V.2. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: INDUSTRIAL STEPS UNDER INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT
The idea of a civil nuclear power programme was first raised in China in the early 1970s. The Nuclear
Industry Ministry was created and took the decision to build a first 300 MW nuclear reactor in Qinshan. Preliminary
contacts between France and China were established at this time in order to prepare turnkey procurement for other
nuclear reactors on another site.
In 1979, economic and technical feasibility studies began for a project in Daya Bay (Guangdong). In 1982, the
project was incorporated into the State construction programme of the Chinese Government. Following the interest
of M. Li Peng, Chinese Vice Minister of Water and Electricity, in the French nuclear power programme, a
memorandum allowing electronuclear cooperation between the two countries was signed on 5 May 1983 at the
governmental level. It was planned that France could provide a 900 MW(e) nuclear pressurized water reactor
(PWR) to China, allowing for some technology transfer.
On the Chinese side, a dedicated structure, the Guangdong Nuclear Power Joint Venture Co. Ltd (GNPJVC)
was formed in February 1985 by the Guangdong Nuclear Power Holding Company Ltd (75%) and China Light &
Power (CLP) (25% through its 100% subsidiary, Hong Kong Nuclear Power Investment Company, Ltd
(HKNPIC)). It was formally established bearing exclusive responsibility for construction and operation.
The cooperation between GNPJVC and Electricité de France (EDF) started in 1986. GNPJVC chose
Framatome for the nuclear islands, GEC-Turbine Generators Ltd for the conventional islands, and EDF for architect
engineering assistance, with French plants Gravelines 5 and 6 as a reference. For that first project, EDF was
responsible for overall technical design, manufacturing surveillance, supervision of construction (direction and
work control) as well as commissioning activities while working completely integrated into the Chinese teams.
The first concrete was poured in August 1987, the first reactor criticality occurred on 28 July 1993 and the
second reactor criticality on 21 January 1994. The first reactor was connected for commercial operation on 1
February 1994 and the second on 6 May 1994; both are M310 Framatome type 1000 MW reactors.
The safety of the plant has been under China National Nuclear Safety Administration supervision. Significant
technical assistance was provided by the Institute for Protection and Nuclear Safety (IPSN), which subsequently
became an independent organization, the Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN).
Of the electricity generated from the Daya Bay plant, 70% goes to Hong Kong and 30% to Guangdong
province. Two dedicated high voltage transmission lines were built in the framework of the project: 400 kV to Hong
Kong and 500 kV to increase the capability of the Guangdong province grid.
54
V.3. INITIAL CONDITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
Before estimating the number of specialists to be trained, some assumptions need to be established, because
the training plan will naturally depend on the chosen technology, the chosen number of units, the number of sites
and the purchasing methods selected by the authorities (turnkey, technology transfer with local manufacture). The
Daya Bay project relied on global intergovernmental agreement and industrial contracts, as described previously;
however, the lessons learned from this case could apply to a more general situation for the development of nuclear
power with the following characteristics:
—Two2 1000 MW(e) units on one site, using a proven technology (PWR).
—Foreign supply for nuclear and conventional islands (with each island supplied in a single batch), auxiliary
installations and shared utilities (water supply, waste and demineralization facilities, etc.).
—A plan leading to a connection to the grid 7 years after the purchasing process (approximately 12 years for the
whole process).
—Consortia of local and foreign companies to take care of the civil engineering and erection.
—Knowledge and technology transfer enabling at least:
• The receiving country government to cope with its nuclear responsibility through its safety authority,
regulatory body and operator;
• The future operator to manage the project and site operation, including maintenance of the power plant.
—No technology transfer for design and manufacture, and no account taken of local manufacture (monitoring of
design and manufacture in the suppliers’ country of origin).
V.4. WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT BEFORE THE BID
It is assumed that some nuclear expertise (research reactor, isotope production, etc.) and theoretical courses in
nuclear physics exist in-country, but that a degree of foreign experience will be necessary to complete the
development of expertise in the construction, operation and safety of a nuclear power plant and/or the legislative
and regulatory instruments governing the licensing process.
Assuming the necessary domestic political consensus has been obtained at the national and local levels
(concerning the choice of site, for example), it is assumed that 12 years (144 months) are needed to plan and
execute the whole programme, from the start of the feasibility study to generation of the first electrical current.
Using a reverse planning process, as indicated previously, the following steps have to be taken:
—Feasibility study (T0 – 144 months): A team of 30 people working for two years is typically necessary. The
first training actions must begin at the same time.
—Planning of the programme and procedures for choosing the supplier (T0 – 120 months): The necessary skills
for the role the operator needs to play as ‘competent buyer’3 in order to enter into a dialogue with the
candidate construction companies must be available and organized by this deadline. The project stakeholders
must be clearly identified within the organization at the start of this planning phase, in particular:
• The safety authority and its technical support body, which must have significant technical expertise;
• The operator and owner responsible for the power plant, which will receive the operating licence from the
safety authority;
• The consortium of industrials, mainly for civil engineering and erection.
Some project ownership assistance type skills will be necessary from early in the programme planning and
supplier selection phase. Most of the personnel on the project management team will finish work when the power
plant is commissioned. After that, the work to which they are allocated will depend on whether the authorities wish
to continue developing a nuclear fleet. Some may join the operator of the first power plant, but experience has
2 Investment in training is not significantly different for one or two units.
3 Similar to ‘intelligent customer’, as defined in the main body of this report.
55
shown that a large scale transfer of personnel between the project management team and the operator cannot be
taken for granted; the operator must start its own skills training separately.
Total number of personnel to be trained (as an example):
—For the overall project management, about 360 people (see Table V.1) of whom approximately 180 should
have a master’s degree and 180 a bachelor’s degree;
—On the construction site, qualified workers should be recruited locally and should require, as a minimum,
specific training on quality assurance and the use of quality procedures.
V.5. SAFETY AND RADIATION PROTECTION — PARTNERSHIP WITH THE IPSN4
Within the general framework of the agreement on analysing nuclear safety, the IPSN and the China National
Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) decided to work in cooperation to evaluate safety at the Daya Bay power
plant.
As part of this cooperation, general training was given on the French approach (structure of France’s
regulatory and quasi-regulatory texts, general approach to evaluating safety), notably to the project leader within
the Chinese safety authority.
It was agreed that the actual safety assessment would be broken down into 14 areas (which dealt with the main
safety assessment areas):
—Classification, qualification of equipment;
—Fire, other internal hazards;
—Core and fuel assembly design;
—Reactor coolant system, safety injection and containment spray systems, stress analysis;
—Civil engineering design;
—Fuel handling and storage;
—Electrical power supplies;
—Protection system, control room;
—Feedwater supply system for steam generators;
—Heat sink;
—Effluents;
—Accident analysis;
4 The Institute for Protection and Nuclear Safety (IPSN) is now the Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety
(IRSN), part of the French nuclear safety system.
TABLE V.1. WORKFORCE NEEDED FOR PROJECT MANAGEMENT (APPROXIMATE FIGURES)
Total MSca BSca
Project manager 1 1
Project management team 10 7 3
Engineering and procurement 40 40
Construction 175 80 95
Testing — startup — commissioning 95 55 40
Contracting monitoring (MSc & BSc) 30
Quality assurance/surveillance (MSc & BSc) 10
a BSc: Bachelor of Science; MSc: Master of Science.
56
—Technical specification, emergency response plan, emergency operating procedure, surveillance tests, startup
testing, maintenance;
—Quality assurance.
The support of the IPSN was sought in two forms:
—With certain areas, account was taken of the fact that the Chinese bodies concerned were able to take direct
responsibility for some of these areas. The IPSN was involved in these cases in an advisory capacity through
experience acquired on similar plants. It facilitated the work of the Chinese teams by giving them advance
warning of difficulties experienced in the past, which meant they could focus their efforts and save time,
while ensuring that the maximum amount of knowledge was transferred to the Chinese.
—With the majority of the areas, the IPSN’s technical contribution took the form of direct participation in the
analysis within Franco-Chinese teams set up for each area. These joint teams involved Chinese trainees
coming to Fontenay-aux-Roses, France, and frequent exchange missions to determine the progress of the
safety analysis work.
Chinese participation in these areas, overall, was estimated at 26 engineers, including the project leader and
the Chinese contact at the Daya Bay site. The corresponding participation of the IPSN was estimated at about
16 engineers, including the IPSN’s ‘China’ project leader.
Between 1986 and 1994, the years during which the Daya Bay power plant was commissioned, purely for
safety and radiation protection analysis purposes, there were:
—9 Chinese delegations making a total of 48 trips to France.
—8 French delegations making a total of 28 trips to China.
—76 placements were organized for 59 Chinese engineers.
—Cumulatively these placements lasted 965 months, with an average duration of about 13 months (longest
placement: 28 months; shortest placement: 4 months).
—The longest placement (28 months) was given on aspects of ‘commissioning’. Aspects of
classification/qualification, monitoring during operation, and radiation and environmental protection received
particular attention. The other point to note concerns training on accident analysis and the use of the
CATHARE code (six placements, with a cumulative duration of 54 months).
Lessons learned
The most effective training was when trainees were integrated into host teams engaged in a particularly
relevant activity for a period of at least six months, preceded by two months on a safety engineer course (SAIS) and
specific training. A sufficient level of French was necessary for engineers to be integrated in this way.
In view of IPSN’s experience and the delicate nature of licensing procedures, which involve a variety of
authorities and combine legal, administrative and technical aspects, it is essential for competent organizations in the
experienced country to make a major effort to help the newcomer authorities to set up their own licensing system.
In this example, 60 was deemed to be a good number of trainees to be trained in nuclear safety and radiation
protection (including its regulatory aspects) for a country starting out in nuclear power generation with two units of
1000 MW(e) each. Assuming the average duration of training is between 12 and 18 months, the cumulative
duration of training should be between 700 and 1100 months.
Among these trainees, about 10 experts (level: PhD) should be provided. Their training (in reactor
physics/fuel, metallurgy, thermal hydraulics, radiation protection) should begin at the start of the project (feasibility
study). They should, as a priority, be placed with the safety authority technical support body, a limited number of
such experts being needed in the operator staff.
57
V.6. PARTNERSHIP WITH EDF FOR OPERATIONS STAFF TRAINING
First it is necessary to clarify how many personnel out of the total active workforce on the site will have
nuclear expertise. Of the 12 000 people working on the Daya Bay site during the building phase, approximately 200
could be considered to have specific nuclear expertise.
Phases
The industrial phase5 lasted approximately 84 months that can be divided as follows, using reverse planning6:
—Design from T0 – 84 months to T0 – 20 months;
—Manufacture from T0 – 78 months to T0 – 25 months;
—On-site construction from T0 – 60 months to T0 – 10 months;
—Commissioning tests from T0 – 4 months to T0;
—Project management, operation and maintenance.
The start of construction coincided with the beginning of training for operational personnel.
Workforce for a nuclear site in operation (two units):
—Site management (director, operations director, maintenance director, logistics director, commercial and sales
director, engineering and outages, cross-company assignment manager): about 10 people.
—Unit operation/control: about 200 people including:
• The management (10 people);
• The operation shift teams: 6 teams of 20–25 people working on a 3 ¥ 8 hour shift roster, plus the daytime
personnel;
• Chemistry and radiochemistry for plant and environment monitoring (20 people);
• Test and performance (10 people);
• Reactor physics and core management (10 people).
—Safety technical advisors and quality auditors: about 18 people. The presence of the nuclear operator’s own
staff responsible for compliance with and inspection of nuclear safety, radiation protection and environment
policy should also be mentioned. These staff are closely associated with the running of the power plant but are
totally independent of the operating department.
—Simulator instructors and classroom instructors: about 10 people.
—Maintenance and technical support: about 270 people. Among them, the workforce for maintenance
ownership (prevention, surveillance, technical and safety appraisal, quality, etc.) must be under station control
in order to enable it to fulfil its safety responsibility. Other parts of the maintenance activities may be
contracted to specialized entities, depending on local policy.
—On-site emergency response and crisis management plan: around 80 people on call simultaneously on a
4–7 week rota, consisting of the site management, maintenance staff, technical support staff, communication
staff, medical staff, etc. The emergency response team comprises personnel with other full-time jobs in the
plant, who receive ad hoc training.
—Support functions (human resources, finance, purchasing, procurement, access control, medical service,
firefighters and information technology staff) require about 160 people, some of whom can be contracted
according to local policy.
5 The industrial phase corresponds to Phase 3 of the Milestones publication: from the date the supplier is chosen to the first
commercial connection to the grid.
6 The reverse planning runs from the choice of the supplier (T0 – 84 months) to the startup of the first reactor (T0).
58
Therefore, the total number of personnel to be trained (over seven years) to manage and maintain the power
plant is in the range of 550–650 people according to the operator subcontracting policy, of whom approximately
110–150 will have, at least, a MSc degree.
Acquisition of knowledge
A project services contract was signed between EDF and GNPJVC, planning for the training of 118 Chinese
engineers for the key operational functions. This contract specified the formation of five groups of trainees
depending on their future duties as well as the dates and the modalities of the training in Europe:
—G1: Site organization and quality control teams (12 trainees);
—G2: Management staff of the team in charge of reactor tests (20 trainees);
—G3: Reactor operation staff (first group — 46 trainees);
—G4: Reactor operation staff (second group — 24 trainees);
—G5: Reactor operation staff (additional group trained in English in China — 38 trainees).
Except for the last group, the training language was French. Three-month training sessions focused on
scientific language for groups G3 and G4 were organized in China by a French teacher recruited by EDF.
Some documents were elaborated in the framework of the training process in order to bring together the
contractual procedures:
—GNPJVC Project Procedures Manual setting the respective roles of EDF and GNPJVC in the training
contract;
—Engineering manual setting the technical and methodological rules for the training project;
—EDF engineering manual providing the necessary practical guidelines to the EDF employees contributing to
the training project;
—QA manuals of the engineering and operations departments of EDF covering the whole programme.
The Chinese side asked for a qualification certificate to be delivered to trainees at the end of the periods in
Europe, which led EDF to formalize the quality control of the training process with precise educational objectives:
—Development of adequate behaviours (safety, security, respect of procedures, etc.);
—Improvement of theoretical and technological knowledge, and command of the specific physical phenomena;
—Development of individual and collective experience (analysis of incidents, implementation of operation and
maintenance procedures, etc.).
In order to reach these objectives, EDF implemented a training process based on ‘shadow training’. This
method was implemented to improve the organized transfer (in situ) of competencies and know-how between each
trainee and one EDF counterpart (who holds, in an EDF plant, the job that the trainee is to do when back in China).
This ‘shadow training’ accounted for the most important part of the whole training programme (60% of the training
in Europe), the rest being theoretical training and simulator training.
This responsibility represents an additional task for the counterpart and needs to be compatible with the
operation of the host plant. This task was initially estimated at 20% of the total work time of the counterpart but
proved to represent closer to 30% of the work time. Seven hundred EDF employees assumed this counterpart role
during more than a week, attracted mainly by interest in the activity (significant voluntary participation) rather than
by any additional financial compensation.
In addition, a tutor was in charge of several trainees during their shadow training in order to maintain a
permanent link between the trainees, the trainers, the counterparts and the hierarchy. Two hundred and twenty tutor
months were mobilized on the project.
Ensuring a quality organization for such an extensive training programme involved verifying compliance with
the rules defined in the procedures through audits.
59
Three types of audit were performed during the project:
—Audits of subcontractors by the project organization (5 performed);
—Audits of the project organization by the EDF nuclear inspectorate (4 evaluations performed at corporate
headquarters, sites and training centres);
—External audit by GNPJVC, which proved to be necessary and profitable for both parties (11 performed).
All these audits were performed in due respect of the IAEA 50 CQA.
Pre-OSART
In November 1990, in the framework of the Pre-OSART mission held at the Daya Bay site, the IAEA
evaluated the training performed in Europe. The result was satisfactory but might have been better if an evaluation
of the level reached had been done.
Lessons learned
—For the operator, an adequate number of experts (PhD level) should be about 1% of the workforce in order to
enable it to:
• Fulfil its entire nuclear responsibility through a thorough knowledge and understanding of some phenomena
(reactor physics, simulations, core calculations, material fatigue, thermal hydraulics);
• Maintain high quality exchanges with the safety authority and the ministries to which it is accountable.
—It should be stressed that experts can only maintain their skills and peer recognition by being involved in
research activities.
—Regarding the prerequisites for trainees, the profiles required for key positions such as deputy plant manager,
civil works manager, information system unit manager, and deputy manager of the local training centre raised
a number of challenges. Pre-selection criteria for Chinese trainees had to take into account the specifics of
Chinese engineering degrees, which differ from French engineering degrees. For example, in groups 3 and 4,
most of the trainees had just finished university (without any previous experience in operating a conventional
power plant, as might have been expected), and were to hold key positions in the nuclear plant. Their
participation in the startup phases was therefore all the more important. However, such difficulties can be
solved through internships in conventional power stations prior to the training period in nuclear power
stations.
—It remains clear that issuing qualification certificate credentials at the end of the training period under EDF
coaching only acknowledges the potential of each trainee. It is not an authorization to hold a specific position
in a nuclear power station, which remains the Chinese authority’s responsibility and is also requested by law
(reactor operators and senior reactor operators have to be licensed on the simulator that represents the actual
unit). On-site training is still required under the operator’s responsibility and if necessary with technical
assistance. In this regard, a diploma would perhaps have been preferable, acknowledging the completion of
the training process with satisfactory results.
—It seems appropriate to set up a dedicated team with a project management type structure for such a large
training project.
—The support of top management was essential, given the number of units of the company involved and the
workload generated.
—It appeared to be more efficient and economically interesting to provide the training in French after providing
linguistic training, rather than providing the training in English.
60
V.7. CURRENT SITUATION
The GNPJVC has since developed its own training capacity in China and now has at its disposal:
—The DNMC Nuclear Training Centre, which can manage 2500 person-months of training per year (i.e. 40 fulltime
simulator instructors, staff of around 200 persons, two full-scope simulators, one basic principles
simulator, 22 000 m² of laboratories). At the end of 2008, this centre had trained and licensed about
300 operators for Daya Bay, Ling Ao, and trained all requested operation and maintenance engineers.
—An agreement signed between three engineering universities (located in Harbin, Xian and Shanghai) and the
DNMC Nuclear Training Centre to develop nuclear engineering courses in order to prepare future operations
and maintenance personnel. These persons acquire basic knowledge of the operation and maintenance of
PWR nuclear power plants. This national manpower represents 28 professors, 28 professors’ assistants and
44 instructors.
V.8. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, a key success factor was to integrate the main structure and organizations that were applied in
France and to adapt them to the Chinese framework. The main idea was to take a well known system and to adjust
it to the specifics of the recipient country in order to give priority to experience instead of theory. This method
required, from the recipient country, pragmatism and some important adaptation capacities and, from the
technology holder, the ability to apply a way of doing something and not a rigid structure. Therefore, the selection
of the people involved was a very important step. Hence, the Chinese trainees were selected based not only on their
current results but also on their high potential for integration.
61
V.9. SUMMARY: HUMAN RESOURCES REVERSE PLANNING
􀁳 Gap analysis of local education
􀁳 Identifying additional education
needs and know-how transfer
T0
Preparation
phase
Preparation of call for bids
Negotiation & site preparation
Feasibility study Construction
Connection
to the grid
T0–12 T0–11 T0–9 T0–7 T0–5 T0–2
􀁳 Definition of the organizational and
managerial structure
􀁳 Completion of skilled surroundings
􀁳 Preparation of job descriptions
for operating personnel
􀁳 Required knowledge
􀁳 Hiring
􀁳 Language training
(if necessary)
􀁳 Basic training for operation
staff, trainers, managers
(local & abroad)
􀁳 On-site training
􀁳 Maintenance personnel trained and allocated
􀁳 Design and organization of the control
training centre and simulator
􀁳 Construction of training
center
􀁳 Start of engineers training
in safety, radiation
protection, control and
maintenance
Commissioning
Human resources
preparation for safety bodies
Human resources
preparation for project team
FIG. V.1. Human resources reverse planning.
62
Appendix VI
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMME IN
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA7
VI.1. INTRODUCTION
During the last forty years, 33 countries have established large scale commercial nuclear power programmes.
All of their experience can be valuable as lessons for prospective countries considering nuclear power as a part of
their long term energy supply. Major countries began their first NPP on the foundation of their strong industrial and
financial standing. The Republic of Korea, however, began its first NPP under barren social, economic and
industrial conditions, which have greater relevance to today’s developing countries. Therefore, it is worthwhile to
document the history and characteristics of the Republic of Korea’s successful nuclear power programmes for the
sake of prospective developing countries.
As of 2006, the Republic of Korea ranked sixth in the world in total nuclear power generation, using 20 units
totalling 17 454 MW(e), which supplied 38.6% of the total electricity demand. NPPs in the country were
successfully operated at the highest average availability factor (93.22%) and capacity factor (90.83%)8 in the world
between 2001 and 2006. Based on the positive experiences, the Government of the Republic of Korea has recently
decided to expand its nuclear power programme as a part of a long range plan to further reduce energy imports and
greenhouse gases. By 2030, nuclear power is expected to supply 59% of the total electricity demand [VI.1, VI.2].
Upon the construction of the first three NPPs on a turnkey basis and the next six NPPs on a non-turnkey basis,
the Republic of Korea’s nuclear industry had successfully localized most technology to build NPPs with its own
designs, namely OPR 1000 and APR 1400 [VI.5]. Therefore, this country’s experience, evolving from one of the
least developed countries into one of the world’s most successful nuclear power states in about forty years, may
provide valuable lessons to developing countries pursuing their first NPP project. On these grounds, the history and
processes of the nuclear power programme in the Republic of Korea are described in this appendix, with highlights
on the successes and mistakes.
VI.2. ESSENTIAL LESSONS — A BRIEF OVERVIEW
This appendix is intended to give a brief overview for readers who want to learn the essential lessons from the
nuclear power programme in the Republic of Korea. However, it is recommended that those involved in the
development of a national nuclear programme read the full information provided in Chapter 3 of this report.
VI.2.1. Integration of diverse knowledge and experience
Nuclear power technology is the product of integrated knowledge from comprehensive R&D and a broad
industrial basis with extensive field experience. The assessments of viable options for a first NPP in a country
require various inputs from a wide range of disciplines and diverse sources. According to the concept of the IAEA
Milestones publication [VI.6], the NEPIO is an integral organization that plays the central planning role by
disseminating and evaluating the options based on knowledge and experience. With the strong support of
government, the NEPIO can be established by organizing competent and extensive human resources from diverse
fields.
7 This appendix is extracted from: SUNG YEOL CHOI, EUNJU JUN, IL SOON HWANG, “Lessons Learned from the Republic
of Korea Nuclear Power Programme: Based on Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power,
NG-G-3.1”, IAEA, Vienna, 2009.
8 The net capacity factor of an NPP is the ratio of the actual output of an NPP for a period of time to its output if it had operated
at full nameplate capacity for the entire period. The availability factor of an NPP is the ratio of the amount of generation time over a
period to the time length of the entire period.
63
For the establishment of the NEPIO, not only scientists and engineers but also economists, lawyers and
psychologists are required. The Korean NEPIO established in the 1960s consisted of a strong government agency
and several associated cooperating organizations. With the leadership of the government agency, the NEPIO was
able to command a wide range of knowledge and experience in diverse fields, including nuclear engineering,
electronics, physics, chemistry, mechanical engineering, economics, physiology, politics and diplomacy. The
NEPIO, which was empowered to direct all relevant organization members, disseminated necessary information
effectively and developed judicious plans.
VI.2.2. Strong national commitment to the nuclear power programme
The execution of an effective national nuclear power programme requires close collaboration with many
domestic and international organizations. It was fortunate for the Republic of Korea that there was a strong national
consensus and firm governmental commitment to the programme. The Government of the Republic of Korea has
been determined to implement nuclear energy as a vehicle for introducing advanced science and technology as well
as for meeting the soaring demand for electricity. The first President of the country, Syngman Rhee, moved to make
agreements with the USA and the IAEA in an effort to obtain much needed international support. The Atomic
Energy Department was soon established directly under the President with the authority to plan and promote the
programme without major administrative obstacles. Because the mandate of the nuclear power programme was to
deliver safe, economical and stable electricity, the strong nationwide commitment has been maintained for
approximately forty years since the establishment of the NEPIO.
VI.2.3. Synergy between the nuclear power programme and other national development programmes
The nuclear power programme has been a part of the national economic development plan during the whole
period. It obviously could not be promoted without a systematic cooperation system with other national
programmes for successful implementation. For example, an NPP could not even start its operation without a
commensurate basis of thermal and/or hydraulic power and an appropriate electric grid capacity. In order to finance
a huge nuclear power programme, a strong economic basis is required. Without a fundamental basis for heavy and
chemical industry (HCI), a country may not succeed in the localization of the nuclear power technology.
The Republic of Korea needed close coordination with the national economic development plan and the HCI
development plan to complete its first NPP. The success of the nuclear power programme provided an ample and
stable electricity supply, which greatly accelerated economic development. This accelerated economic
development, in turn, generated sufficient capital to construct additional NPPs. This cycle is one of the most
valuable lessons learned from this experience and contributed to making the Republic of Korea one of the advanced
industrial countries today. Energy planners and decision makers in developing countries should keep this lesson in
mind to avoid the typical but critical problem of inadequate coordination of a broader national development
programme.
VI.2.4. Strategies for securing human resources and establishing a self-reliant education system
The Government recognized the importance of competent human resources for the nuclear power
programme. The NEPIO launched human resources development programmes to provide the personnel needed to
launch, execute and upgrade the national nuclear power programme. The strategy of human resources development
in the country consisted of securing high quality staff, supporting overseas education, in collaboration with the
IAEA and the USA, and preparing for domestic education and training programmes.
To immediately secure high quality human resources, the government guaranteed high level positions and
salaries for qualified personnel coming from other fields and provided good working environments. In order to
meet the demand for high level expertise not available domestically, foreign experts were invited at all phases of
development, including the operational phase of the first NPP. The Government soon realized that up-to-date
education and training could not be effectively provided in the Republic of Korea and began overseas training for
young talent.
To establish a long term human resources development programme, the Government launched undergraduate
nuclear engineering departments at universities from the early period. The brightest and most enthusiastic students
64
rushed into this new, exciting field with strong governmental support. Moreover, the Government provided grants
to encourage nuclear research at the universities in an effort to attract the entire academic world to the programme.
The national support for radiation applications in agriculture, health, physics, chemistry and biology led the nuclear
power programme to play a key role in the promotion of advanced science and technology in the Republic of Korea.
With the return of the first wave of overseas trainees, universities in the country were able to strengthen the nuclear
engineering education. Moreover, training centres in research institutes invited foreign experts to give lectures and
to develop various lecture programmes for establishing higher education and training.
VI.2.5. Localization through technology transfer
With KEPCO’s initiative in the national nuclear power programmes, the first three NPPs were started on
turnkey contracts. In the initial stage, the Government correctly assessed and concluded that domestic industries
were not capable of meeting the requirements for nuclear quality assurance related to the construction of NPPs.
This was why the country decided to introduce its initial NPPs on a turnkey basis and to restrict domestic roles to
non-safety-related areas such as civil engineering and construction work with the supervision of foreign
contractors. KEPCO gradually increased the role of domestic industry but as subcontractors to foreign main
contractors. From this stage, the technology transfer approach can be best described by ‘on the job training’ and ‘on
the job participation’ under the direction of foreign suppliers. KEPCO developed the NPP localization plan for the
completion of the country’s fourth plant by starting a non-turnkey basis contract for the NPP. The plan was carried
out in close collaboration with foreign vendors for the development of a standardized NPP for the Republic of
Korea. With the growing construction, operation and localization experience, KEPCO undertook the main
contractor’s role for the tenth NPP in 1987.
This localization policy contributed not only to saving foreign currency but also to increasing the capacity
factor with the faster supply of spare components from localized suppliers. The quality management responsibility
of local suppliers also became a strong driving force to improve the quality of both nuclear and non-nuclear
products, leading to the country’s trading competitiveness. This benefit of nuclear power technology transfer spread
to other industrial sectors, including steelmaking, shipbuilding and heavy equipment manufacturing.
VI.2.6. Successful investigation and reflection of world nuclear power trends in planning
A national nuclear power programme in isolation cannot evolve competitively because it should be tailored to
meet the many international standards and rules. Hence, close international collaboration and study of world
technology and safeguards are among the most important activities in the launch of a nuclear power programme.
National energy planners should consider and incorporate the results of these trends into their plans.
After the world’s first operation of a commercial NPP in 1956, many countries rushed into the development
of an NPP. The news media in the Republic of Korea closely followed this trend and reported important issues in the
nuclear industry. Many intellectuals described, by writing in the news media, how the nation could be changed and
would advance in the new world. Under the national atmosphere for growth, the Government studied international
situations by sending people abroad, participating in international cooperation programmes and establishing
overseas offices. The NEPIO effectively utilized the information network for the development of the nuclear power
programme. Whenever the NEPIO faced difficult questions, lessons from reference countries were collected to help
reach rational conclusions. In this process, the Government dispatched special investigation teams with people from
various organizations. The investigation teams visited key organizations in advanced countries to collect
information and check their policies, as well as to finalize plans for NPP developments. The investigation
encompassed major issues, including the current state of technology development, the economic efficiency of their
plants, the know-how of their nuclear power programmes, the construction and operation experience of NPPs and
the process of site selection, fuel cycle policy, strategy of securing nuclear fuel and financing options for NPPs.
VI.2.7. Slow preparation of a safety regulatory system
With the confirmation of the first NPP construction plan, the Government started to prepare the nuclear safety
regulation system. The preparation of a regulatory framework was a time consuming process and resulted in a
heavy workload. Due to tight schedules and a shortage of personnel, most technical rules were borrowed from the
65
country of the reactor’s origin, the USA. In parallel, Japan, an industrialized neighbour, was a model for the
Government driven economic development programme. As a consequence, the legal framework of the Japanese
nuclear power programme was also introduced. The coexistence of different rules from the USA and Japan caused
conflict and confusion at various levels of the regulatory process.
The initial regulatory system did not encompass safeguards and nuclear materials control until the IAEA
introduced ‘Additional Protocols’. The experience of the Republic of Korea highlights the importance of early
development of a regulatory framework for safety and safeguards. It is desirable to begin the effort as early as
possible to establish a streamlined and independent regulatory system.
FIG. VI.1. Chronological table of the nuclear power programme in the Republic of Korea.
Phase 1 (1956–1960), Phase 2 (1961–June 1968), Phase 3 (June 1968–1978) and Operational Phase
(until 1990)
1956
— Delegation to the first ICPUAE
— Republic of Korea/USA Atomic
Energy Agreement (the first
international agreement)
— Established atomic energy section
— First exhibition for Atoms for Peace
1957
— Joined as a member of IAEA
1958
— Enacted Atomic Energy Act
— Established Atomic Energy
Department
— Established Department of Nuclear
Engineering at Hanyang University
— Contracted for the first research
reactor
1959
— Opened Atomic Energy Research
Institute
— Established Department of Nuclear
Engineering at Seoul National
University
1961
— Established KEPCO (owner/operator)
— Promoted long term plan for NPP
— Launched the first five-year economic
development plan
1962
— Launched first five-year electric
power development plan
— Operation of the first research
reactor
1964
— Started NPP site evaluation and
selection
1966
— Confirmed site for NPP
1967
— Established Ministry of Science
and Technology
— Established Office of Atomic Energy
1968
— Confirmed long term plan for national
nuclear power programme
— Invited bid for the first NPP
— Signed NPT
1970
— Signed the contract for the first NPP
1971
— Started the construction of KORI-1, the first
NPP, on turnkey basis
1975
— Entry into force of NPT
— Joined Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement
(CSA)
1976
— Signed the contract of KORI-2
1978
— Started the operation of KORI-1, the first NPP
— Signed the contract of KORI-3, 4th NPP on
component approach, non-turnkey basis
1981
— Established Nuclear Safety Center
(regulatory body) under KAERI
1986
— Started seeking nuclear waste sites
1987
— Signed the contract for Yonggwang 3&4 NPP,
with KEPCO as the prime contractor
1989
— Joined COCOM
1990
— Established Korea Institute for Nuclear Safety
(regulatory body)
2005
— Acquired sites for LILW
66
VI.3. THE HISTORY AND PROCESS OF NUCLEAR POWER DEVELOPMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA AND LESSONS RELATED TO HUMAN RESOURCES
VI.3.1. Phase 1 (from 1956 to 1960): Considerations prior to a decision to launch a national nuclear power
programme
In the early period of the nuclear power programme in the Republic of Korea, a management group was
formed and began studies on how to launch a national nuclear power programme. The study group focused on the
development of management expertise and generated an understanding of the scope and depth of management
required to pursue the full implementation of a nuclear power programme [VI.6].
The IAEA Milestones publication [VI.6] deals with the wide range of issues essential to the development of a
national nuclear power programme. It also suggests a phased approach by assigning issues with different priorities
to different stages of the programme. For example, there are some issues such as the spent fuel, radioactive waste
management and disposal that can be deferred to later phases. Nevertheless, an early assessment of all issues can
help lead to effective and advanced plans for a successful national nuclear power programme, provided that enough
human resources are available.
Human resources development
Human resources development was one of the top priority tasks of the Government. With limited human
resources in the areas of radiation protection and application strategy, it was difficult to launch domestic education
systems on nuclear engineering. This was when the Government obtained valuable advice from W.L. Cisler, who
emphasized the development of human resources by saying:
“This one gram of uranium can provide the same amount of the energy that comes from three tons of coal.
Coal is the energy dug from ground, but nuclear power is the energy dug from human brain. Countries such as
Korea that are poor in resources should develop the energy that can be dug from human brain. If you want to
operate a nuclear power plant, you should develop human resources first. If Korea brings up the young talents
now, then Korea becomes the country that can turn on electric lights from nuclear power 20 years later.”9
[VI.18]
9 Translated from Cisler’s speech written in Korean.
TABLE VI.1. MAJOR ROLE OF ORGANIZATIONS IN A NATIONAL NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMME
Organization Role and function in a nuclear power programme
AEC Ultimate decision making commission
AED, BO General administration, investigation and planning, and control of radioactive isotopes
AERI Basic study and technical support
Ministry of Foreign Affairs International cooperation
Ministry of Commerce and Industry Electricity generation and electric grid programme
Economic Planning Board Decisions on budget of country and support of nuclear power programme with economic
knowledge base
University Human resources development and basic research
Industry Participation in a nuclear power programme with own special field
67
With Cisler’s advice, the Government recognized the importance of human resources development for its
nuclear power programme. When the AES (pre-NEPIO) was established, it failed to launch a human resources
development programme. The AES started with only seven staff members who were drawn from informal study
group. They were the only available human resources in the Republic of Korea for the nuclear energy programme.
The reason for establishing the AES under the Ministry of Education, not the Ministry of Commerce and Industry,
was because the Republic of Korea hoped that the education of young scientists and engineers would become the
most important task.
The Government soon realized that up to date education and training could not be provided within the country
and began supporting overseas training of young researchers. From 1956 to 1958, most human resources
development was made through overseas training, funded by the Government despite the extreme scarcity of
foreign currency. In March 1959, the AED established a human resources development plan, which mainly
consisted of an overseas training programme for 200 people. From 1955 to 1964, 237 persons were trained abroad.
Among these, 127 persons were funded by the Government, 80 persons were supported by the IAEA, three persons
were on the Colombo plan and 27 persons were sent by other overseas aid [VI.19]. More than half of the people
went to the USA and the UK to learn the emerging nuclear power technology.
For establishing a long term human resources self-development programme, the Government also
implemented a domestic system by launching undergraduate education. Nuclear engineering departments had been
established at Hanyang University and Seoul National University in 1958 and 1959, respectively. Natural science,
physics and subjects related to radioactive isotopes were taught to the brightest students who rushed into the new,
exciting field. Significant numbers of students continued studying nuclear engineering at overseas universities,
research institutes or domestically at AERI after graduating with a BSc degree. It was about ten years later, upon the
return of the first graduate students from their overseas studies, that engineering subjects (i.e. nuclear reactor
analysis and design, material, chemical and waste disposal) could be taught at universities [VI.8].
In addition, at the end of 1950s and the early 1960s, special privileges existed for securing high quality human
resources for the nuclear power programme. In contrast to other national organizations and research institutes, the
staff of the AED took high positions in government institutions. The director of the AED held the same position as
other ministers and as the director of BO and AERI; this was the rank of deputy minister. Moreover, the section
head of each subsystem was a first class public official, and their staffs were also considered as high-ranking public
officials. Their salaries were high enough to include a basic salary, research allowances and a danger allowance in
order to attract high quality human resources working at universities and other domestic and overseas industries and
research institutes. The location of the nuclear power programme institution also played an important role in
attracting human resources. Specifically, AERI was located near the Seoul National University campus to promote
convenient collaboration with competent human resources at a reputable educational institution. Moreover, the
Government provided grants to encourage nuclear technology research at universities. There was no precedent for
providing the grants for the encouragement of research at universities before that time. This special support
contributed to stimulating the entire academic world, including students, and helped gather human resources for the
nuclear power programme [VI.10].
The initial human resources development efforts are summarized in Table VI.2. Table VI.3 shows the
development of nuclear engineering departments in the domestic education system, especially universities, over the
entire period.
Stakeholder involvement
It is important to evaluate stakeholder involvement when defining and pursuing nuclear power programme
goals. Since 1956, the United Kingdom (UK) and the USA began the first operation of commercial NPPs. This
stimulated many countries to develop or plan commercial NPPs. The news media in the Republic of Korea closely
followed this trend of world nuclear energy. In daily newspapers, journalists reported important advancements in
nuclear energy, and many intellectuals wrote editorials about how the country would be changed and could
advance. Also, many magazines provided the public with a great deal of information about the internal and external
68
situation through featured articles. The peaceful use of atomic energy became the focus of public interest. The
Republic of Korea–US Atomic Energy Agreement10 further prepared the public to expect the introduction of an
NPP.
TABLE VI.2. HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS AT THE END OF THE 1950s [VI.9, VI.20]
Activities for human resources development Note
9 April 1956 1st ISNSEa 2 persons (Argonne Lab.)
3 September 1956 2nd ISNSE 5 persons
25 January 1957 3rd ISNSE
April 1957 4th ISNSE Date indefinite
10 September 1957 5th ISNSE 3 persons
1 January 1958 6th ISNSE 4 persons
1 March 1958 The establishment of a Nuclear Engineering
Department at Hanyang University
10 September 1958 7th ISNSE 30 persons: USA 20, UK 8, France 2
7 October 1958 8th ISNSE 15 persons: Australia 6, West Germany 9
1 March 1959 The establishment of a Nuclear Engineering
Department at Seoul National University
9 January 1959 9th ISNSE 2 persons: France 2
1 March 1959 The opening of AERI
15 July 1959 First Nuclear Science Council Predecessor of the Korean Nuclear
Society: one time per year
6 August 1959 10th ISNSE 22 persons
a ISNSE: International School of Nuclear Science and Engineering (the human resources development programme for sending people
to overseas educational institutions through internal and external sources of funding)
TABLE VI.3. ESTABLISHMENT OF DEPARTMENTS OF NUCLEAR ENGINEERINGa [VI.20]
Year University
1958 Hanyang University
1959 Seoul National University
1979 Kyunghee University
1981 Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
1985 Chosun University
1985 Cheju National University
a This does not include specialized schools only for non-electric uses.
10 The official name is the Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government
of the United States of America Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy.
69
The Government held an exhibition on the peaceful use of atomic energy to gain further support from the
public. Photos and models provided by the US Government were displayed for six days in six cities: Seoul, Busan,
Daegu, Gwangju, Daejun and Junju. The exhibitions attracted over one million people. It was a great experience for
the public and succeeded in softening their image of the atomic bomb and illustrating how nuclear technology could
be used in a peaceful manner [VI.12].
Industrial involvement
Nuclear facilities require a much higher level of quality assurance than do other industrial systems. The
NEPIO and industrial leaders exploring the involvement of domestic industry in a nuclear power programme had to
fully examine accumulated experience and the ability to meet high quality standards. The Republic of Korea had
virtually no high quality industrial basis in the initial phase despite the fact that many construction companies
seriously wanted to obtain opportunities in this emerging new business. The country established a ‘learning by
participating’ strategy for helping the domestic industry to accumulate experience through strictly controlled
participation.
In the process of constructing the research reactor, the NEPIO decided that GA, the vendor of the research
reactor, would take charge of the entire quality control process for all the facilities. They limited the domestic
involvement to non-safety grade construction activities. The NEPIO set up a committee for selecting domestic
industry participants [VI.8].
However, even with the restricted involvement, domestic industry participants were found to cause delays in
the schedule. The cost increased due to insufficient industry experience in handling a large and technically
demanding project. It was a very difficult experience for the NEPIO, even though the construction of a research
reactor is a very small project compared with that of a commercial NPP. The painful experience was found to be a
key learning opportunity towards satisfying high quality standards in future NPP projects.
Nuclear safety
Nuclear safety was always regarded as the top priority issue during the planning, implementation and
operation of the nuclear power programme. Most of the infrastructure for nuclear power has some impact on safety.
An important lesson was learned that participating in a network of international cooperation in nuclear safety leads
to significant benefits for a country starting a nuclear power programme. At the pre-project phase, detailed and
across-the-board actions are not required beyond the recognition of the need and regulations for nuclear safety in
planning a nuclear power programme.
Emphasis on nuclear safety was given to all individuals involved in the country’s programme. As a
neighbouring country, many of its citizens were killed or injured when atomic bombs were dropped on Japan.
Nuclear power was associated with the image of the atomic bomb, which had the effect of forming the safety
culture for nuclear reactor facilities in the country. However, the shortage of trained human resources did not allow
for the preparation of a dedicated organization for nuclear safety regulation during Phase 1.
With the widespread fear of radiation and the atomic bomb, the Republic of Korea tried to manage and control
the use of radioactive isotopes and radiation facilities. When the Atomic Energy Act was enacted, the safety
regulation activities regarding radioactive isotopes licensing, supervision and penalties were explicitly defined as
nuclear-specific provisions, distinguished from other provisions for general industrial activities.
VI.3.2. Phase 2 (1961–June 1968): Preparatory work for the construction of an NPP after a policy decision
has been taken
Human resources development
In the early phase, with few domestic NPP experts, the development of human resources involved two major
activities: sending trainees abroad and inviting experts for lectures, reviews and research. Trainees were trained in
the USA and Europe. The wide range of information that they brought in led to thoughtful decisions for selecting
the first NPP and reactor types.
70
From 1955 to 1964, the country sent 234 persons abroad, but only 150 persons returned to the Republic of
Korea (Table VI.4). The Government training programme was triggering a ‘brain drain’ problem because many
people did not take advantage of the job opportunities in the domestic nuclear power programme, the country’s
preferred field, and decided to take better jobs overseas. To solve the problem, in 1961, the Government imposed
return obligations on all students on Government scholarships [VI.10]. Students studying abroad at Government
expense had to work in domestic organizations for a prescribed period. Contributing factors to the ‘brain drain’
were that the Government had limited support in the basic sciences in which many students were specialized, and it
did not have a detailed plan to distribute these human resources [VI.9].
When the first wave of trainees returned, the Republic of Korea began domestic education by establishing
nuclear engineering departments at universities and opening special lectures in government research institutes.
International education experts were instrumental in establishing these domestic programmes. For example, in
1960, the Government invited an IAEA mobile laboratory for radioactive isotopes to operate in four cities for four
weeks each. After the establishment of the Radiological Research Institute and Radiation Research Institute in
Agriculture, the Government began domestic lecture programmes on radiation for medicine and agriculture that
were offered twice a year [VI.9]. In 1968, when a detailed plan for nuclear power construction was confirmed,
KEPCO assembled international and domestic experts to begin a specialized six week course titled “An Elementary
Course on Nuclear Power Plant Operation” for training their staff working in thermal power plants. From the end of
Phase 2 to the beginning of Phase 3, many classes were held on non-destructive testing, quality evaluation of
construction, and systems and components of nuclear power plants.
The initial university curriculum for nuclear engineering mostly consisted of atomic physics and radiation.
Because of the shortage of professors, researchers from AERI taught students. Nevertheless, nuclear engineering
emerged as one of the most popular fields among young students. Some of the brightest and most enthusiastic
students rushed into the nuclear power field. By 1963, nuclear reactor physics became a regular course in nuclear
engineering. With the construction of the NPP in 1970, university programmes expanded beyond theoretical
education into engineering courses such as the design process of an NPP, nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear power
economy, reactor safety analysis and heat transport. This comprehensive education programme on nuclear
engineering was the product of about 15 years of human resources development since the first ICPUAE [VI.6].
Many graduates of the new education programme entered national nuclear power programme organizations such as
KEPCO to become today’s nuclear industry leaders.
Other important human resources for the nuclear power programme were the large population of Korean
scientists and engineers working in foreign organizations with advanced degrees in areas related to nuclear
engineering. The Government encouraged them to relocate in the country by providing generous compensation for
relocation.
TABLE VI.4. PEOPLE RETURNED FROM STUDYING NUCLEAR POWER ABROAD [VI.12]
Sources
Year
Government IAEA ICA Other Total
Send Return Send Return Send Return Send Return Send Return
1955–1964 127 78 81 61 10 9 17 2 234 150
1965 — — 13 6 — — 3 1 16 7
1966 2 3 5 2 — — 6 2 13 7
1967 — — 10 11 — — 5 2 15 13
1968 — — 17 17 — — 4 4 21 21
1969 — — 10 4 — — 1 2 11 6
Total 129 81 135 101 10 9 36 13 310 204
71
Stakeholder involvement
In order to draw public interest to nuclear energy, the Government regularly opened exhibitions on nuclear
technology in several cities every year starting in 1960. This also included photo exhibitions on the commercial,
industrial, medical and agricultural uses of nuclear power. In addition, a public lecture and symposium was held in
three to four cities per year starting in 1962. Through these efforts, the Government wanted to remove the negative
image of nuclear energy among the general public and industry, and to demonstrate the peaceful uses of atomic
energy.
FIG. VI.2. The geographical distribution of people studying abroad in 1969.
Engineering, 81
Physics, 68
Chemistry, 53
Electric
Engineering, 16
Argriculture, 22
Biology, 18
Health Physics,
12
Medical
Science, 37
ETC, 3
FIG. VI.3. Distribution of people studying abroad in 1969 by area of study.
72
The Government published basic informational books for the public titled “You and Atomic Energy,”
“Atomic Energy Class,” and “Atomic Energy Story”, and translated academic books for students and intellectuals
as well as pamphlets published by the US Atomic Energy Commission for public distribution. The Government
also published the magazine “Nuclear Power Today” three or four times a year from 1960 to 1972. It provided
scientists and the public with news and information on nuclear power research and applications at home and in
foreign countries. In the 1960s, television was not widely available. Hence, newspapers and books were the most
important mass media used to inform the public [VI.9].
Industrial involvement
In planning for NPP construction, the Government evaluated the capability of domestic industries to supply
commodities, components or services to the NPP. They found that the domestic industry could not satisfy the
nuclear quality assurance requirements. That was why the Republic of Korea decided on a turnkey contract for the
first NPP. Under a turnkey basis, bid specification and participation of the domestic industry were limited to nonnuclear
safety related areas such as civil engineering. From the 1970s, the Government started to develop HCI
under the Five Year Economic Development Plan. With the enhanced HCI ability, the participation of domestic
industries expanded from a peripheral role to the provision of core technology. The Republic of Korea’s industry
participation can be described simply as ‘Learning by Participating’, as described in Phase 3 under HCI
development [VI.41].
Procurement
With the launch of the First and Second Economic Development Plans, domestic industries also grew rapidly.
However, this was limited only to labour intensive industries, and there was no capability to meet the high entrance
criterion for nuclear technology. In the 1960s, the Republic of Korea was not yet able to start an HCI development
plan, yet it still remained an assignment. This was one of the reasons that the first NPP was constructed on a turnkey
basis with limited participation in civil engineering.
Nuclear safety
The Republic of Korea introduced provisions for licensing and supervision in the Atomic Energy Act, and
ICRP and other authorized international standards were reflected in domestic radiation safety regulations. Also,
there was regulatory inspection for people handling radioactive isotopes. This radiation safety management was
aimed at minimizing health and physical damage caused by radiation exposure during industrial radiation
applications and research activities [VI.12].
In the installation and operation of the first research reactor, located next to Seoul National University, reactor
safety was considered one of the most important issues. The country decided to install the research reactor on a
turnkey basis with the emphasis on quality control for safety while having limited domestic participation in nonsafety
areas.
VI.3.3. Phase 3 (from June 1968 to 1978) and the Operational Phase (from 1979 to 1990): Activities to
implement the first nuclear power plant, maintenance and continuous infrastructure improvement
Human resources development
In the long range nuclear power programme plan of 1968, the demand for human resources related to nuclear
technology was estimated for the next 20 years. Based on the plan, the Nuclear Training Centre was established in
KAERI in 1967. This institute not only developed human resources but also helped technology transfer and
cooperation among research institutes and industries. The KAERI Nuclear Training Centre helped provide human
resources development of government and private industries at the various stages from elementary knowledge of
nuclear power to regulation for domestic industry and government organization [VI.39]. This human resources
development role steadily expanded from the research institute to private training programme, facilities and courses
on nuclear industries.
73
Moreover, in 1979, the KAERI Nuclear Training Centre invited IAEA experts as part of its Training Course
on Safety Analysis and Review for Nuclear Power Plants. In addition to the IAEA delegates, experts came from the
USA, Canada and France. By 1988, the programme offered 36 courses by 247 foreign lecturers on introductory and
advanced nuclear power technology to 1511 students. There were lecturers from within the country who provided
course overviews and summaries to overcome the language barrier. Also, all foreign lecturers prepared presentation
materials in a uniform context. The local lecturers later localized the course by becoming post-lecturers to their own
classes [VI.5]. After the PWR was confirmed as the first NPP, KEPCO frequently sent staff to a PWR plant in
Japan. In addition, KORI-1 set up a sister plant relationship with the Genkai plant and made regular visits [VI.11].
With the expectation of commercial NPP operation in the Republic of Korea, KEPCO estimated that about
170 people were needed for its operation, but it had secured only 92 people by the end of 1972. KEPCO contracted
with WEICO for training on operations and control for repair and on fuel management. Additional staff were
trained at existing thermal plants and research organizations. Also, KEPCO opened training centres for continued
education and for beginning plant operations at the KORI-1 site. Table VI.5 summarizes overseas training
programmes held during the construction period of KORI-1 [VI.8, VI.47]. Table VI.6 shows KEPCO training
courses for new plant operators, including domestic and overseas courses.
The NSC launched a human resources development programme through overseas training with the support of
the NPP and related facilities suppliers, the USA, Canada and France. Also, many IAEA experts visited the
Republic of Korea to support the regulation programme and hold on-the-job training courses at NPP sites. Some
experts stayed several months with the NSC staff at NPP sites to support and observe the country’s regulatory
activities [VI.43].
TABLE VI.5. OVERSEAS TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR KEPCO STAFF DURING CONSTRUCTION OF
KORI-1
Field No. of staff Period Note
Planning More than two persons a year July 1968
Executive 21 March–November 1970 (9 months)
Training with WEICO
Technical aids and components (spare) 20 March–November 1971 (9 months)
Repair 45 March–November 1971 (9 months)
Operation (control) 85 August 1972–April 1973 (9 months)
TABLE VI.6. KEPCO TRAINING COURSES FOR NPP OPERATORS
Step Content Period
TR-1 Elementary course of thermal power plant 3 months
TR-2 Elementary course of nuclear power plant 3 months
TR-3 In-service training 6 months
TR-4 Overseas training 3–24 months
TR-5 Startup training at new NPP 12 months
TR-6 Supplementary education 1 week–3 months
74
Stakeholder involvement
After India’s nuclear test, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) formed the London Club, which limited
sensitive technology transfer and aimed at international confidence in each country’s nuclear power programme.
The Republic of Korea had already established the Atoms for Peace policy by signing the NPT and other
international agreements. The multinational technical cooperation with other countries helped promote nuclear
power as a key option for electricity supply [VI.9, VI.15].
During the construction of KORI-1, the Republic of Korea and the USA closely cooperated and agreed to
launch the Republic of Korea–US Joint Standing Committee on Nuclear and Other Energy Technologies in 1976.
Also, the Republic of Korea established the Joint Consultation Committee with France and Canada prior to the
operation of the fuel fabrication facility and Wolsung [VI.8].
Industrial involvement
Only turnkey basis contracts were employed for the first three plants. As KORI-1 was constructed on a
turnkey basis, domestic industries and technicians participated in civil engineering, construction and nondestructive
testing11. Local industries tried to establish a quality control database and experience by participating in
the construction of the second and third NPP. Based on the long term plan, in 1975 the Republic of Korea
encouraged the development of local architectural engineering (AE). It established Korea Atomic Burns and Roe
(KABAR) with Burns & Roe as a local AE firm. A year later, KAERI acquired it and renamed it Korea Nuclear
Engineering & Services (KNE). KNE was operated by KAERI, the main owner, in order to easily secure human
resources [VI.49]. KNE began participation as a subcontractor to the engineering design and construction of the
fifth NPP.12 KNE staff received training from Bechtel Corporation, the primary AE contractor, before participating
in the actual project. All of the contracted AE companies were required to undertake joint engineering work with
KNE. In the 1980s, domestic companies became the main contractors with foreign companies working as
subcontractors.
In addition, the Government established the indigenous content policy not only for engineering but also for
NPP components. The Government classified NPP components by local content feasibility per component,
importance and targeted schedule. Private enterprises were established for development and manufacturing using
specifications from KAERI. Quality management for local suppliers also became a driving force to improve the
quality of both nuclear and non-nuclear products. This also had a very positive influence on the steel making
industry and the ship building industry [VI.9].
Tables VI.7 and VI.8 indicate contract conditions and indigenous portions of NPP construction in the
Republic of Korea. A ‘learning by participating’ strategy was also applied in the commercial NPP construction.
Procurement
The first three NPPs were contracted on a turnkey basis, which allowed for limited domestic participation.
From the fourth NPP, the contract terms were specified to ensure a certain level of indigenous content with the
approval of foreign contractors. The indigenous portion was increased over time. All of the indigenous components
were required to pass inspection in accordance with the same standards applied to foreign-made components.
Ultimate responsibility for NPP performance was placed on the main contractors who promoted suppliers’ active
participation in quality control of subcontractors.
From the fourth to ninth NPPs, these projects were contracted on the non-turnkey, component approach basis,
in which the total project scope was divided into several main contracts among contractors, and the foreign main
contractors were obliged to bear the contract liabilities with local subcontractors under their supervision. This
contract scheme not only stimulated the expansion of the indigenous portions but also sped up nuclear technology
transfer.
11 Hyundai Engineering and Construction Co, Ltd.: Subcontractor for the reactor system; Dong Ah Construction: Subcontractor
for the turbine generator; Yuyang Atomic Energy: Main contractor for non-destructive testing.
12 In 1982, KNE was moved to KEPCO and changed to its present name, Korea Power Engineering Company (KOPEC).
75
From the tenth NPP, Yonggwang-3 and 4, KEPCO decided to pursue an ambitious plant standardization
programme based on the construction experience of the NPP with the same authorized power, 950 MW(e), from the
third unit to the ninth unit. The country succeeded in constructing Yonggwang Units 3 and 4 as the reference plants
of the Korea Standard Nuclear Power Plant. Ultimate responsibility for NPP performance was placed on the main
TABLE VI.7. CONTRACT CONDITIONS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREAa
[VI.50]
Plant Type (MWe) NSSS (Sub) TG (Sub) AE (Sub) Date
order Construction start Commissioned
KORI-1 (turnkey) PWR (587) WEICO GE Gilbert 1969 November 1971 April 1978
KORI-2 (turnkey) PWR (650) WEICO GE Gilbert 1974 May 1977 April 1983
Wolsung-1 (turnkey) PHWR (679) AECL NEI Canatom 1973 May 1977 April 1983
KORI-3 PWR (950) WEICO
(KHIC)
GE
(KHIC)
Bechtel
(KOPEC)
1978 April 1979 September 1985
KORI-4 PWR (950) WEICO
(KHIC)
GE
(KHIC)
Bechtel
(KOPEC)
1978 April 1979 April 1986
Yonggwang-1 PWR (950) WEICO
(KHIC)
WEICO
(KHIC)
Bechtel
(KOPEC)
1978 December 1980 August 1986
Yonggwang-2 PWR (950) WEICO
(KHIC)
WEICO
(KHIC)
Bechtel
(KOPEC)
1978 December 1980 June 1987
Ulchin-1 PWR (950) Framatome
(KHIC)
Alsthom
(KHIC)
Framatome
(KOPEC)
1980 March 1982 September 1988
Ulchin-2 PWR (950) Framatome
(KHIC)
Alsthom
(KHIC)
Framatome
(KOPEC)
1980 March 1982 September 1989
Yonggwang-3 PWR (1000) KHIC
(CE: sub)
KHIC
(GE)
KOPEC
(SL: sub)
1987 June 1989 March 1995
Yonggwang-4 PWR (1000) KHIC
(CE: sub)
KHIC
(GE)
KOPEC
(SL: sub)
1987 June 1989 March 1996
a Sub (Subcontractor), NSSS (Nuclear Steam Supply System), TG (Turbine Generator), BOP (Balance of Plant), AE (Architectural
Engineering), WEICO (Westinghouse Electric International Company), AECL (Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd.), Framatome
(Framatome et Compagnie), KHIC (Korea Heavy Industries and Construction Co.; Present name: Doosan Heavy Industries &
Construction Co., Ltd), GE (General Electric Company), CE (Combustion Engineering), NEI (NEI Parsons Ltd), Gilbert (Gilbert
Associates Inc.), KOPEC (Korea Power Engineering Company), SL (Sargent and Lundy Co.).
TABLE VI.8. INDIGENOUS CONTENT OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (%) [VI.50]a
Unit NSSS TG BOP CE A–E and design
Kori-3 and 4 10 11 33 95 37
Ywongkwang-1 and 2 19 30 42 95 44
Ulchin-1 and 2 26 40 55 95 46
Ywongkwang-3 and 4 63 94 73 95 95
a The indigenous portion is defined as the amount of money related to domestic suppliers’ involvement to
the amount of the total construction cost in NSSS, TG, BOP and CE; AE is defined as a person-hours of
domestic staff involvement in AE.
76
contractors, which promoted active participation of suppliers according to the indigenous policy. It allowed local
companies to perform most of the design and engineering work, construction and maintenance services and further
procure most NPP components from domestic suppliers.
Nuclear safety
The IAEA Milestones publication [VI.6] emphasizes nine items for establishing nuclear safety infrastructure.
They include: operator skills and attitudes; management system; safety culture; legal framework; regulatory
independence, competence and authority; technical competence; financial stability; emergency preparedness; and
international connectivity. These issues were already discussed in other parts of this publication.

DhanalakshmiIAS

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