In Myanmar, a winning hand for America

While Washington’s engagement with Burma is a demonstration of the triumph of diplomacy over isolation, the future depends on Yangon’s commitment to democratic processes

The recent upturn in the United States’ relations with Myanmar — a key neighbour of India — was the outcome of years of diplomatic manoeuvring following the 1988 democracy uprising and the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) military government’s refusal to acknowledge the 1990 general election results. It was also a result of the U.S. government’s dual-track policy of using carrots and sticks.

Unlike India, which moved to normalise relations with SLORC by the mid-1990s, the U.S. made some fundamental demands as a condition for normalising bilateral ties. These included: the release of all political prisoners (over 2,000 held in different prisons across Myanmar in the beginning of 2012), inclusive dialogue with opposition parties and ethnic minorities, adherence to United Nations non-proliferation agreements on nuclear weapons and an end to any illicit cooperation with North Korea, greater accountability on human rights issues, and an end to violence against ethnic minorities. The U.S. also asked the Myanmar government to hold free and fair by-elections.

Steady steps

On January 13, 2012, a total of 651 political prisoners were either released or offered presidential pardon by the Myanmar government. Those released included prominent political prisoners, including leaders of the 1988 democracy uprising, the ex-military intelligence chief and deposed Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt, and ethnic Shan leaders Hkun Htun Oo and Sai Nyunt Lwin, who were sentenced to 93- and 85-year prison sentences respectively.

Second, the Thein Sein government signed ceasefire agreements with several ethnic armed groups: the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), Chin National Front (CNF), Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), Karen National Union (KNU), Karen Peace Council (KPC), National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K), New Mon State Party (NMSP), Pa-O National Liberation Army (PNLA), and Shan State Army–North (SSA-N).

Third, the government successfully held by-elections in April last year. Pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy won in 43 of the 44 seats it contested. One seat each was won by the ruling USDP and the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP). The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) candidate captured the seat where the NLD candidate was disqualified. The SNDP won a seat from the Shan state. The participation of the NLD and other political parties associated with ethnic minorities boosted the government’s claim for legitimacy and credibility of its seven-step “road map” towards democracy that initially began in 2003.

As the Obama administration promised to reciprocate action for action, Derek Mitchell, Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma, was confirmed as the new U.S. Ambassador on June 29. U.S. investment sanctions were lifted on July 11, which was followed by the suspension of import bans on goods from Myanmar on September 27. The lifting of investment sanctions enabled U.S. companies and international financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to begin re-establishing links with Myanmar.

The U.S. made four important achievements from the improvement in relations: it demonstrated the triumph of diplomacy over isolation; it won an assurance that Myanmar had not engaged in any illicit engagement with North Korea on nuclear programmes; it was able to emerge as a symbol of democracy and human rights around the world; and it got to build a firmer foundation of its presence in Southeast Asia.

In addition, the improvement of relations enabled the U.S. to re-establish the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) mission to Myanmar, to lend support for a normal UNDP country programme, and to facilitate travel to the U.S. for select Myanmar officials and parliamentarians. It also paved the way for the U.S. and Myanmar to cooperate on the recovery of the remains of Americans missing in action or taken prisoners of war during World War II.

By improving bilateral relations with the United States, the Myanmar government achieved the goal of legitimacy it had long sought. Until the April by-elections, the U.S. and other western nations still considered the results of the 2010 general elections unrepresentative of the people. The other major achievement was the lifting of sanctions.

Obama’s visit

The positive diplomacy culminated in President Barack Obama’s visit to Myanmar on November 19, the first ever visit by a sitting U.S. President. His historic tour was, however, criticised by several rights groups, which argued that it was premature to make such a high-profile visit when violence still continued in the Kachin and Rakhine states, and when political prisoners remained behind bars. The Obama administration said the President’s visit was to acknowledge the democratic reforms and to encourage further reforms.

On a positive note, both governments must be congratulated for taking the necessary steps to improve bilateral relations. However, the primary concern now is whether political gestures from the Myanmar government will lead to addressing ethnic minority problems, which remains at the heart of decades-old conflicts in the country. When can the Myanmar government sign a ceasefire agreement with ethnic Kachins, and will the signed ceasefire agreements with various groups lead to guaranteeing autonomy?

Moreover, will the 2008 constitution be amended to remove the inherent role of the military in politics, which is currently guaranteed 25 per cent of seats in Parliament without election? Will all remaining political prisoners be released unconditionally? Can the Rohingya problem be resolved amicably? Uncertainty remains as to how the U.S. government will respond in case of the non-fulfilment of these expectations.

Overall, 2012 was a significant year in terms of diplomatic rapprochement. Nevertheless, the longevity and durability of bilateral relations between the two nations will be contingent upon how democratic transition progresses inside Myanmar.

(Nehginpao Kipgen is general secretary of the U.S.-based Kuki International Forum. His research focuses on the politics of

France leads the tax debate

The December 28 decision by the French constitutional court, the Conseil Constitutionnel, that President François Hollande’s showpiece 75 per cent income tax for high earners is unfair and therefore unconstitutional may look like a severe political setback, but when examined more closely turns out not to be quite that. The court rejected the tax, which would have affected all with an annual income above €one million, because French income tax is levied on households and not individuals, so it would not apply, for example, to a couple each of whom earns €900,000 but would apply to any individual earning a million euros or more. Only about 1,500 people would have had to pay the new rate, which was due to take effect today and was expected to raise €500 million in a crucial contribution to Mr. Hollande’s plans to reduce the budget deficit to 3 per cent of GDP by 2014. One high-profile opponent is actor Gérard Depardieu, who says he now plans to move to Belgium, apparently for tax reasons, and has responded to Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault’s criticism of his move as “shabby” with an angry open letter claiming that the Socialist government is punishing success and talent.

Mr. Depardieu’s position has, however, been criticised by, for example, the award-winning actor Philippe Torreton, who says that the move amounts to leaving the French boat in the middle of a storm. Unemployment, at 3 million, is at a 15-year high and has crossed 10 per cent after rising for 16 months in succession; the French central bank estimates an economic shrinkage of 0.1 per cent in the third quarter of 2012. Much of the public argument among artists and other celebrities is focused on the division between those who see paying the higher rate as a patriotic duty and those who consider it an unfair imposition, but the court decision itself has been made by a largely conservative-appointed court, which also includes three former presidents ex officio, all of whom are also conservatives. That fact will add fuel to the political flames, not least because in August 2011, 16 of France’s wealthiest people, including the L’Oréal heiress Liliane Bettencourt and several major chief executives, published an open letter in the magazine Le Nouvel Observateur calling for higher taxes on the rich as a matter of national solidarity in a time of economic crisis. Mr. Hollande and his government plan to revise the tax proposal and reintroduce it, but whatever the outcome, France is leading the way by showing that tax rates are about the nature of society and not just about technical issues.

Moving forward to go back

The roadmap from Paris explicitly states that the Taliban will be included in Afghanistan’s power structure and given non-elective positions at different levels

Persistent efforts by multiple western players finally paid off. The Taliban and the Kabul government met officially in Chantilly, a suburb of Paris, on December 20 and 21 under the aegis of a French think tank called the Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique. The Taliban was represented by senior leaders Shahabuddin Dilawar, former Taliban ambassador to Saudi Arabia, and Naeem Wardak — both based in Doha.

The government side was represented by the Higher Peace Council chairman Salahuddin Rabbani. Also participating were Yunus Qanuni, the ideologue of the opposition National Coalition of Afghanistan led by Abdulla Abdulla, Ahmad Zia Massoud, brother of the legendary Tajik commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, as well as representatives of the hardline Hizb-ul-Islam of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. In all, there were about 20 delegates participating in the talks.

For an understanding

It is noteworthy that the Kabul delegation included a sprinkling of non-Pashtun tribes — Massoud, a Tajik, Mohaqqeq, a Hazara leader, and Faizullah Zaki, an Uzbek. Mr. Massoud said there was a new generation which did not believe in war and sought an understanding with the Taliban. The Taliban, for its part, clarified in no uncertain terms that no negotiations with anyone were involved and that the Taliban “wants the world community to listen to our goals;” in other words, the Taliban approached the Paris talks as a platform to air its ideology and demands.

A few weeks prior to the Chantilly meeting, Kabul had disclosed a ‘Peace Process Roadmap’ consisting of five steps, which sought to outline a vision in which, by 2015, the Taliban, the Hizb-e-Islami and other armed groups will have given up armed opposition. There is reason to believe that this ‘roadmap 2015’ is a joint Afghan-Pakistan draft, prepared in close consultation with the United States. The ‘roadmap’ assumes that all the armed insurgencies will have transformed themselves into political groups and will actively participate in the political and constitutional process, including national elections. The first step focuses on securing Pakistan’s collaboration which would include Pakistan releasing specific Taliban detainees. Pakistan has already repatriated several mid-level Taliban prisoners and might release Mullah Baradar. The second step envisages direct talks with the Taliban, which Pakistan should facilitate, in Saudi Arabia in the first half of 2013. Step three calls for ceasefire and transformation of the Taliban into a political party. The final steps include securing peaceful end to the conflict during the first half of 2014 and moves to sustain the long-term stability of Afghanistan and the region. Lip service is paid in the ‘roadmap’ to the principles of respect for the Afghan constitution and renunciation of ties with al-Qaeda.

A concession

This was the first time senior Taliban representatives sat down with the government and other opposition groups. This, in a way, amounts to a concession by the Taliban which had, thus far, refused to talk to the Kabul government which it did not regard as legitimate. There was no joint statement after the Chantilly meeting. In the words of the sponsoring think tank, the objective was to encourage the Afghans to “project themselves towards the horizon of 2020.”

Nonetheless, the importance of the talks having taken place should not be minimised. The Taliban issued a statement after the talks in which it rejected the present constitution on the ground that it was made “under the shadows of B52 bombers of the invaders.” “We need a constitution based on the holy Islam, national interest, past achievements and social justice,” the Taliban declared. How much should be read into the fact that the Taliban talked of ‘holy Islam’ and not ‘based on sharia’? It also referred to ‘social justice;’ does it suggest an implied pledge to go slow on women’s issues? Turkmenistan offered to host a follow-up meeting to Chantilly but Kabul refused; did Kabul feel that the meeting was more meaningful for the Taliban than for the government?

It is obvious that this flurry of activity has only one, perfectly understandable objective from the American and the West’s perspective: to provide a respectable screen behind which to implement the withdrawal from Afghanistan. As for Hamid Karzai, he too would wish to leave behind some legacy whereby there will be at least an agreement on paper which, hopefully, will avoid the country’s descent into chaos which many analysts anticipate post-2014.

Significant

The announcement of the Paris talks signifies several things. Firstly, it means that the U.S. and NATO have given up, once and for all, the objective of defeating the Taliban. Secondly, there is more than a tacit admission that the Afghan National Security Force will be incapable of ensuring security in the country post-2014,considering that only one out of 23 Afghan brigades is considered capable of operating on its own. The ‘green on blue’ attacks have also played their part in this. Thirdly, it proves that the British are still far ahead of the Americans in understanding the region. The U.K. called for co-opting the Taliban in the government years before even Mr. Karzai did, as the only way out for the country.

Fourthly, and importantly, it must be borne in mind that the West, especially the Americans, never had any problem with the Taliban. It was the treatment of women that made the then U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright anti-Taliban. The forceful action after 9/11 was aimed at al-Qaeda, not the Taliban. Had the Taliban agreed to cut ties with al-Qaeda then, it would still be ruling in Kabul. The West by and large would have nothing to worry as and when, not if, the Taliban obtains a share in the government. The roadmap explicitly states that the Taliban will be included not only in the state power structure but will also be given non-elective positions at different levels. This is a clear reference to governorships in provinces such as Paktia, Paktita and Khost.

India should watch these developments most warily. There is no reason for us to rejoice at the possibility of the Taliban becoming a part of the government. We did support the reconciliation process some time ago, but it was probably more theoretical at that time when the three ‘red lines’ were still in place, namely, respecting the constitution, renunciation of violence and severing ties with al-Qaeda. These red lines have since been given up and are now projected as objectives to be considered at the end of the process rather than as preconditions for talks. It is one thing to support the efforts to achieve stability in Afghanistan and another to welcome an arrangement which will guarantee the Taliban a share in power with all the negative consequences that might follow for us.

Pakistan, the winner

Pakistan has emerged the clear winner. We should have no illusion. Mr. Karzai has decided to throw in his lot with Pakistan, his ‘brother’. Pakistan, for all its protestations of not wanting the Taliban returning to power in Kabul, has been given the pride of place in Mr. Karzai’s roadmap which confers key role on Islamabad in the whole process. Pakistan has succeeded in convincing its western interlocutors that there is a paradigm shift in the political mindset in the country. Once the Taliban manages to get a share of power in Kabul, it will eventually endeavour to grab total power. Since it will remain the most cohesive force, ideologically, politically and militarily, it would be imprudent to exclude this possibility. In other words, the Taliban might well achieve around a conference table what it failed to achieve in the battlefield.

5 year plan & ndc

The draft of the 12th Five Year Plan covering the period 2012-13 to 2016-17, approved by the National Development Council last week, aims to achieve an annual average growth rate of 8 per cent, scaled down from 8.2 per cent. The Prime Minister has called the target “aspirational,” while a few Chief Ministers, notably Narendra Modi, found it lacking in ambition. Political statements apart, it is clear that the focus on growth rates has tended to distract attention from the rest of the planning exercise. In retrospect, most official projections have been over-optimistic. The approach paper of the 12th Plan talked of an annual average growth rate of between 9 and 9.5 per cent. The Prime Minister had gone even further, hoping for double-digit growth rates during the latter part of the Plan. What made those projections totally unrealistic was the fact that the economic slowdown was already getting reflected in successive quarterly GDP data. The Union Budget (2012) projected an ambitious growth rate of 7.6 per cent, way above what most other forecasters had estimated at that time. The government has been slow in lowering the forecasts even when conclusive evidence of deceleration has been coming in. True to form, the government expects the economy to grow by between 5.7 and 5.9 per cent this year — the first year of the 12th Plan — when the growth during the first half has been at just 5.4 per cent. Considering that a revival in manufacturing where the slowdown is most pronounced cannot happen that quickly, an annual average rate of 8 per cent over the plan period can be achieved only if the growth rate in each of the last three years is well above 9 per cent.

The Planning Commission is banking on reinvigorating a few existing policies while expecting vastly improved performance in certain key areas: gross fixed capital formation rate to go up to 35 per cent from the present 32 per cent, with the private sector playing a major role in catalysing such investment; a new look industrial policy that focuses on better coordination between the government and the private sector to vastly improve business sentiment; stressing the importance of national industrial manufacturing zones in a scheme of reviving industrial output. More controversial are suggestions to “streamline” labour laws by increasing the threshold employment for labour legislation to 300. The case for increasing agricultural growth to 4 per cent largely through technology absorption is unexceptionable. Yet all these and more may not be sufficient to achieve an annual growth rate of 8 per cent. Since any likely shortfall will reflect adversely on the planning process itself, the question then is: is the obsessive focus on growth rates counterproductive?